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THE PACIFIC MU'fUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY
OF CALIFORNIA (a Corporation) et at, Appellants.
v. F. BRITTON McCONNELL, as Insurance Commissioner, etc., et a!., Respondents.
[1] Insurance-Incorporated Insurers - Voluntary Mutualization.
-Essential differences in procedure relating to voluntary
mutualization of solvent insurer and involuntary mutualization of insolvent insurer are that, under statutory provisions
relating to voluntary mutualization (Ins. Code, § 11525 et seq.),
plan is adopted by directors subject to approval by stockholders
and Insurance Commissioner, and no court proceedings are
necessary; whereas under provisions for involuntary mutualization of seized insurer (Ins. Code, § 1043 et seq.), plan is
formulated by commissioner as conservator without consent of
stockholders or directors, and must be approved by court.
[2a,2b] Id.-Incorporated Insurers - Voluntary Mutualization.- Where new life insurance company is organized as part of rehabilitation of old insolvent company, and is solvent and nondelinquent, applicable statutory provisions for mutualization
of new company are Ins. Code, § 11525 et seq., which govern
voluntary mutualization of solyent nondelinquent insurers.
[3] Id.-Incorporated Insurers-Powers of Oommissioner as Liquidator.-Insurance Commissioner has power to create new
corporation in order to preserve business of seized insolvent
insurer, there being no statutory limitation on his right to
do such acts, in addition to powers expressly enumerated, as
he may deem necessary in connection with handling of affairs
of insolvent company. (See Ins. Code, §§ 1037, 1043.)
[4] Id.-Incorporated Insurers-Powers of Oommissioner as Liquidator.-When salvaging business of seized insolvent insurer,
greatest possible protection should be given to creditors and
other interested parties" and Insurance Commissioner may
properly conclude that such objective can best be accomplished
through formation of new company divorced as far as possible
from control of those who were in charge of old company
when it experienced financial difficulties.
McK. Dig. References: [1,2,7,19,22-24] Insurance, § 6.5; [3,4,
20] Insurance, § 11.18; [5, 6] Insurance, § 11.24; [8] Judgments,
§§ 395,396; [9,13] Insurance, § 11.14; [10] Judgments, § 338; [11]
Courts, §9: [12,17, 18] Jud~ments, §318: rJ4] Decedents' Estates,
§1053: [15] Trusts, §358; [16] Judgments, §413; [21] Corporations, § 580•
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[5] Id.-Incorporated Insurers-Rehabilitation - New CompanyStatus.-New life insurance company, organized by Insurance
Commissioner as part of rehabilitation of old insolvent com·
pany t is separate and distinct entity, and when business is
transferred it ceases to be business of old company and be01.
comes bU!'liness of new company.
[6] ld.-Incorporated Insurers - Rehabilitation-New CompanyStatus.-Fact that new life insurance company, organized by
Insurance Commissioner as part of rehabilitation of old insolvent company, may for some purposes have served as agent
or instrumentality of commissioner does not destroy its identity
as separate company.
[7] Id.-Incorporated Insurers - Voluntary Mutualization.-Fact
that Insurance Commissioner, acting as conservator of insolvent insurance company and as sole holder of stock of new
solvent company, organized by commissioner as part of rehabilitation of old company, gave advance consent to a plan
of mutualization did not disqualify commissioner from passing
on fairness of the plan which was promUlgated. (Ins. Code,
§ 11526.)
[8] Judgments - Res Judicata - Mattera Ooncluded.-Though
causes of action be different, prior determination of issue is
conclusive in subsequent suit between same parties as to that
issue and every matter which might have been urged to sustain
or defeat its determination. (Disapproving inconsistent language in Green v. Green, 66 Ca1.App.2d 50, 59 [151 P.2d 679];
Babcock v. Babcock, 63 Cal.App.2d 94, 97 [146 P.2d 279];
Bank of America v. McLaughlin, 22 Cal.App.2d 411, 417 [72
P.2d 554].)
.; 01
[9a, 9b] Insurance - Incorporated Insurers - Rehabilitation and
Agreements Therefor.-Order of court approving agreement
for rehabilitation of insolvent life insurance company by organizing new solvent life insurance company is conclusive as
to such agreement and plan for mutualization of new company
in subsequent mandamus proceeding by old company and its
stockholders to review action of Insurance Commissioner ap.
proving mutualization plan, even if mutualization was accomplished under wrong statute, where basic issue before court
when agreement was submitted for approval was propriety
of each of its provisions, including such plan, and there was
nothing which prevented questions with regard to validity of
such agreement from being litigated.
[10] Judgments-Res Judicata.-Generally, a final judgment or
order is res judicata even though contrary to statute, where
[8] See Cal.Jm.. Judgments, §§ 190, 193; Am.Jur. Judgments,

I§ 178,l8l.
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court has jurisdiction in fundamental sense, i.e., of subject
matter and parties.
[11] Courts-Jurisdiction.-There is difference between lack of
jurisdiction in fundamental sense, which is ordinarily essential
for collateral attack, and broader meaning of term "lack of
jurisdiction" when used in determining availability of prohibition or certiorari to review order or judgment.
[12] Judgments - Collateral Attack - Want of Jurisdiction.-In
some instances requirements of statute may relate to subject
matter jurisdiction, and disregard of statute may render judgment void and subject to collateral attack.
(18] Insurance-Incorporated Insurers-Rehabilitation and Agreements Therefor.-Where court which approved agreement for
rehabilitation of insolvent insurance company by organizing
new solvent company and providing plan for mutualization
of new company had jurisdiction of subject matter and parties,
unless case comes within some exception collateral attack
cannot be based on ground that courJ authorized mutualization
to proceed under wrong statute.
[14] Decedents' Estates-Distribution-Decree-Conclusiveness.Probate decrees are res judicata, though they direct distribution pursuant to wills which are contrary to statute, since
court sitting in probate is under duty to determine validity
of instrument before it.
[16] Trusts - Accounting - Proceedings - Conclusiveness.-An
order settling trustee's account is res judicata as to propriety
of purchase of innstment certificates which were issued contrary to statute. (Disapproving Estate of Rowe, 66 Cal.App.
2d 594 [152 P.2d 765].)
[16] Judgments-Res Judicata--Issues Relating to Contracts.Judgments enforcing contracts are bar to defense of illegality
in subsequent litigation.
[1'1] Id.-Collateral Attack-Want of Jurisdiction.-A judgment
contrary to statute may be collaterally attacked though court
had fundamental jurisdiction where unusual circumstances
were present which prevented earlier and more appropriate
attack.
[18] Id.-Collateral Attack-Want of Jurisdiction.-Proceedings
to prohibit or annul judgments of contempt for violation of
injunctions and other equitable orders made contrary to statute
constitute permissible forms of collateral attack.
[19] Insurance-Incorporated Insurers-Voluntary Mutualization.
-In absence of statutory provision to contrary, stockhold~rs
of solvent company can contract to consent to future plan of
voluntary mutualization, and such agreement is not improper
merely because shares are held by Insurance Commissioner as
eoDael"Vator of aeiud insolvent insurez.

)

718

PAOIFIC MUT. LIFE INS. CO.

v.

MCCONNELL

[44 C.2d

[20] Id.-Incorporated Insurers-Powers of Commissioner as Liquidator.-Powers vested in Insurance Commissioner by Ins.
Code, §§ 1037, 1043, relating to insolvent insurers, are sufficiently broad to authorize him, as sole stockholder of seized
insurer, to give advance consent to plan of mutualization for
o.
new solvent company.
[21] Corporations-Omeera-Powers of Directors.-Direotors must
ordinarily act on advice of corporate officers and other persons
who have expert knowledge.
[22] Insurance - Incorporated Insurers - Voluntary Mutualization.-Where Insurance Commissioner's approval of plan for
mutualization of new solvent insurance company did not involve
deprivation of property rights or vested rights, but was in
essence permit or license authorizing new company to purchase
its own stock, function of superior court was to determine
whether action taken by commissioner was arbitrary or constituted abuse of discretion, and in upholding action of commissioner it properly refused to conduct trial de novo.
[2S] Id.-Incorporated Insurers - Voluntary Mutualization.-Insurance Commissioner's approval of plan for mutualization of
new solvent insurance company is sustained by testimony of
experts highly skilled in matters of insurance company valuation that price fixed for purchase of stock was fair, that provisions relating to time and manner of payment were necessary
for safety and stability of new company, and that such plan
gave due regard and protection to rights of all persons interested in new company and would be fair in its operation.
[24] Id. - Incorporated Insurers - Voluntary Mutualization.Claim that insolvent life insurance company and its stockholders were denied procedural due process by Insurance Commissioner's acceptance of conclusions of price determination
committee with reference to mutualization plan for new solvent life insurance compnny without having before him all
facts on which those conclusions were based, and by fact that
committee itself relied on statistics furnished by its actuary
without reviewing all supporting data, is unsupported where
two of four members of such committee testified in detail as
to how committee arrived at its determinations, and actuary
testified regarding his report which was introduced in evidence,
and where these witnesses, who were available for crossexamination, were experts in insurance and investment fields,
the fact that other members of committee who assisted actuary
were not called as witnt:t;ses being immaterial in absence of
sbowing that old company and its stockholders sought their
testimony.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Loa
.A.n&eles County. Paul Nourse, Judge. Affirmed.
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Proceeding in mandamus to review action of Insurance
Commissioner in approving play! for mutualization of an insurance company. Judgment denying -vrit affirmed.
Joseph L. Lewinson, Frank B. Belcher, C. Ray Robinson,
Melvin, Faulkener, Sheehan & Wiseman, Henry W. Low and
William B. Boone for Appellants.
C. Ray Robinson and William B. Boone, as Amici Curiae
on behalf of Appellants.
O'Melveny & Myers, Paul Fussell, Homer I. Mitchell, James
E. Cross, George B. Gose, Frank P. Doherty, Guy Knupp and
Peery Price for Respondents.
Lloyd W. Dinkelspiel and Heller, Ehrman, White & McAuliffe, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Respondents.
GIBSON, C. J.-The Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company of California (hereinafter referred to as the "old
company") and certain of its stockholders brought this mandamus proceeding in the superior court to review the action
of the Insurance Commissioner in approving a plan for mutualization of a second corporation, Pacific Mutual Life
Insurance Company (hereinafter called the "new company"),
which had been organized by the commissioner as part of
the rehabilitation of the old company. The court upheld the
action of the commissioner, and plaintiffs have appealed from
the judgment.
In 1936 the old company was in a hazardous and insolvent
condition within the meaning of the Insurance Code, and its
business and assets were taken over by the Insurance Commissioner,· as authorized by statute. (Ins. Code, §§ 1011, 1013.)
Pursuant to section 1043 of the code, a rehabilitation agreement was entered into between the new company and Commissioner Carpenter, as conservator of the old company,
whereby most of its assets were transferred to the new company in exchange for all the new company's capital stock.
The stock was to be held by the commissioner as conservator
for the benefit of the creditors, policyholders and stockholders
of the old company. The new company assumed substantially
·Six successive commissioners, Messrs. Carpenter, Goodcell, Caminetti,
Garrison, Downey and Maloney, have passed upon matters relatin~ to
the insolvency of the old company.
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all the obligations of the old company, including a limited
obligation with respect to noncancellable accident and health
policies (referred to herein as " non-can policies") , and
agreed to set up a special fund for restoration of benefits to
holders of those policies.
In December 1936, after a hearing, the superior court
approved the rehabilitation agreement and authorized the
commissioner to perform all the obligations required on his
part. This order was affirmed in Carpenter v. Pacific Mut.
L. Ins. Co., 10 Ca1.2d 307 [74 P.2d 761]. (Affd. in NebleU
v. Carpenter, 305 U.S. 297 [59 S.Ct. 170, 83 L.Ed. 182].) In
February 1937 7 an order was made providing for the liquidation of the old company and appointing the commissioner
as liquidator. It was upheld in Carpenter v. Pacific Mut.
L. Ins. Co., 13 Ca1.2d 306 [89 P .2d 637]. In 1938 the commissioner transferred the stock of the new company to five trustees
who were given legal title to the stock with power to vote it
in accordance with the purposes of the rehabilitation agreement. The order approving the transfer was affirmed in Caminetti v. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. Co., 22 Ca1.2d 344 [139 P.2d 908].
The rehabilitation agreement set forth the method by which
a plan for mutualization of the new company could be formulated. It pro'vided that 10 per cent of the participating life
policyholders eould request the new company to create an
appointing committee consisting of the president of the Lifa
Insurance Association of America. the president of Stanford
University and the provost of the University of California at
Los Angeles. The appointing committee was directed to select
a price determination committee composed of persons skilled
in matters of insurance company valuation. If the price
determination committee concluded that voluntary mutualization could be practicably accomplished, it was to propose a
plan of mutualization in accordance with the laws of this
state. By the terms of the agreement the commissioner, as
sole shareholder of the new company, consented in advance
to the plan of mutualization to be formulated.
A price determination committee was appointed, consisting
of Alva J. McAndless, president of the Lincoln National Life
Insurance Company of Fort Wayne, Indiana; Horace R. Bassford, vice president and chief actuary of the Metropolitan
Life Insurance Company of New York; Ray D. Murphy, vice
president and chief actuary of the Equitable Life Assurance
Society of New York; and AlbC'rt J. Hettinger, a partner in
Lazard Freres and Company, a firm engaged in investment
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banking. After three years of study the committee proposed
a plan of mutualization, which provides that, upon the occurrence of certain conditions, the' new company shall buy all
of its own capital stock for $3,000,000, plus interest from
December 31, 1948, the price to be augmented should the
restoration of benefits under the non-can policies be completed
before 1973.
The proposed plan of mutualization was adopted by the
directors of the new company on May 5, 1950. On September
22, 1950, after a hearing, Commissioner Downey approved
the plan, finding that it would be fair and equitable in its
operation, and thereafter it was approved by the policyholders
of the new company. This proceeding in mandamus was
then brought to review the action of the commissioner, and
the trial court concluded that there was substantial evidence
to support his findings and that he had not exceeded his jurisdiction or abused his discretion in approving the plan.
Plaintiffs attack the judgment upon numerous grounds, and,
although many of their contentions may be disposed of by
application of principles of res judicata, we believe that the
problems may be more clearly presented by first discussing
the propriety of the determination of the various points without regard to the binding effect of prior adjudications.
The first problem which we must consider is whether the
proper statutes were followed in the formulation and approval
of the mutualization plan. As contemplated by the rehabilitation agreement, all steps in connection with the adoption of
the plan were taken pursuant to sections 11525 et seq. of
the Insurance Code, which relate to voluntary mutualization
of a solvent insurer.- Plaintiffs assert that the applicable
statutes for mutualization of the new company are sections
1043 et seq., which govern involuntary mutualization of an
insolvent insurer. t [1] The essential differences in procedure
-Section 11525 of the Insurance Code provides: H A solvent domestic
incorporated insurer having a paid-in capital represented by outstanding
shares of capital stock and issuing, on a reserve basis, nonassessable
policies of life insurance or of both life and disability insurance, may
convert itself into an incorporated mutual life insurer, or life and disability insurer, issuing nonassessable policies on a reserve basis. '1'0 that
end it may provide and carry out a plan for the acquisition of the outstanding shares of its capital stock for the benefit of its policyholders,
or any class or classes of its policyholders, by complying with the requirements of this chapter."
Sections 11526-11533 contain detailed provisions relating to procedure
for adoption and execution of the plan of mutualization.
tSection 1043 of the Insurance Code provides in part: "In any
po~odin& 1.1Dde.r ibM ari;icle. ihe commiisioner, .. ~ or ..
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are that under the sections relating to voluntary mutualization
of a solvent company the plan is adopted by the directors.
subject to approval by the stockholders and the commissioner,
and no court proceedings are necessary; whereas under the
Wovisions for involuntary mutualization of a seized insurer
the plan is formulated by the commissioner as conservator
without consent of the stockholders or directors, and it must
be approved by the court.
[2a] The new company is solvent and nondelinquent, and
there is no sound reason why it should be mutualized under
the statutes relating to insolvent insurers. [8] The commissioner bad power to create the new corporation in order
to preserve the business of the seized insurer. Section 1043.
which authorizes the commissioner to enter into rehabilitation
agreements, contains no express limitation on what may be
included in them, and section 1037 provides that the enumeration of the powers of the commissioner shall not be construed
as a limitation upon him or upon his right to do such other
acts as he may deem necessary in connection with the handling
of the affairs of an insolvent company.- [4] When salvaging the business of a seized insurer the greatest possible
protection should be given to creditors and other interested
parties, and in the present instance the commissioner evidently
concluded that this objective could best be accomplished
through the formation of a new company divorced as far as
possible from the control of those who were in charge of
the old company when it experienced financial difficulties.
[5] The new company is a separate and distinct entity,
and when the business was transferred it ceased to be the
liquidator, may, subject to the approval of said court, and subject to
such liens as may be necessary mutualize or reinsure the business of
such person, or enter into rehabilitation agreements." The words" such
person" include an insolvent insurer as referred to in sections 1010
et seq. of the Insurance Code dealing with insolvency and delinquency.
Section 1045 provides: "If at any time after the issuance of an
order under section 1011 .•. it shall appear to the commissioner that
the purposes of section 1011 can be best attained by the mutualization
of such life insurer, the commissioner may formulate a plan for the
mutualization of such insurer." Section 1046 et seq. set forth the
necessary procetlural steps.
·Section 1037 of the Insurance Code provides in part: "The enumeration, in this article, of the duties, powers and authority of the commissioner in proceedings under this article shall not be construed as a
limitation upon the commissioner, nor shall it exclude in any manner
his right to perform and to do such other acts not herein specifically
enumerated, or otherwise prodded for, which he may deem necessary
or expedient for the accomplishment or in aid of the purpose of 8UCh
proeeedinKs.' ,

June 1955] PACIFIC MUT. LIFE INS. Co.

tJ.
[44 C.M '115: 285 P.2d 636]

MCCONNELL

723

business of the old company and became the business of the
new company. In Garrison v. Pacific Mitt. L. Ins. 00., 83
Cal.App.2d 1, 9-10 [187 P.2d 893}, it was held that the identity
of the new company "is utterly distinct from that of old
company," that it "cannot be fairly said that it is a continuance of old company," and that the new company "is a
separate entity that came into being after old company's
insolvency was declared. . . ." [6] The fact that the new
company may for some purposes have served as an agent or
instrumentality of the commissioner does not destroy its
identity as a separate company. [2b] Accordingly, as oontemplated by the rehabilitation agreement, the applicable statutory provisions for mutualization of the new company are
those found in section 11525 et seq., which govern voluntary
mutualization of solvent nondelinquent insurers.
[7] Plaintiffs nevertheless contend that it was improper
to follow the procedure set up in the code for mutualization
of a solvent company because, they assert, the commissioner
in doing so was forced to act in a dual capacity with conflicting
interests. Section 11526, which prescribes the method to be
followed in mutualizing a solvent insurer, provides that the
plan shall be: ". • • (b) Approved by the vote of the
holders of at least a majority of the outstanding shares at a
special meeting of shareholders called for that purpose, or
by the written consent of such shareholders. (c) Submitted
to the commissioner and approved by him in writing." Commissioner Carpenter as the sole holder of the stock of the
new company consented in advance to the plan of mutualization, and Commissioner Downey approved it after holding a
hearing to ascertain if the plan would be fair and equitable
in its operation. Plaintiffs claim that the responsibilities of
the commissioner under subdivision ( c) are different from
and may conflict with his duties under subdivision (b). Even
if there might be such a conflict under some circumstances,
it would not follow that it was improper to adopt the statutory
procedure set forth for the mutualization of a solvent company. The legislative scheme for the mutualization of solvent
nondelinquent insurers would in some instances be defeated
if the commissioner were disqualified for the reasons urged
by plaintiffs, and it must be assumed that the Legislature
realized that the commissioner might be required to pass upon
the fairness of a plan in a case where he, acting as conservator,
had previously consented to mutualization on behalf of the
stockholders. In numerous cases where the action of an admin-

\
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istrative officer was necessary to prevent defeat of the statutory
scheme, his participation has been upheld, although th~
grounds for disqualification were much more serious than those
raised here. (For example, see Thompson v. Oity of Long
Beach, 41 Ca1.2d 235, 243-244 [259 P.2d 649] ; Oaminetti v.
Pacific Mut. L. I1zs. 00., 22 Ca1.2d 344, 365-366 [139 P.2d
908] ; Federal Oonst. 00. v. Ourd, 179 Cal. 489, 493-495 [177
P. 469, 2 A.L.R. 1202]; Scannell v. Wolff, 86 Cal.App.2d
489, 492-493 [195 P.2d 536] ; Nider v. Homan, 32 Cal.App.2d
11, 13 [89 P.2d 136].) The fact that Commissioner Carpenter
gave advance consent on behalf of the stockholders to a plan
of mutualization did not disqualify Commissioner Downey
from passing upon the fairness of the mutualization plan.
which was promulgated.
An alternative reason for rejecting plaintiffs' claim that it
was improper to follow the procedure set forth in sections
11525 et seq. in the mutualization of the new company is
that the validity of the rehabilitation agreement, which provided for voluntary mutualization, is now res judicata. A
copy of the agreement was attached to and made a part of
the petition which sought approval of the agreement. The
petition was filed pursuant to section 1043, which provides
that rehabilitation agreements entered into by the commissioner are subject to the approval of the superior court. The
validity of all the provisions of the agreement was put in
issue by the petition and determined by the court. The order
of December 4, 1936, approved the agreement "and each and
all of the terms and conditions thereof, and the plan therein
embodied," reciting that all interested parties had been given
a reasonable opportunity to be heard on "the question of
fairness, justice, equity, feasibility, and propriety" of the
agreement and the plan. All parties were forever enjoined
from making any complaint with respect to the agreement
or any provisions thereof. This order was affirmed in Carpenter v. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. 00., 10 Cal.2d 307 [74 P.2d 761].
(See also Oarpenter v. Pacific Mut. L. Ins 00., 13 Cal.2d 306,
314-316 [89 P.2d 637] ; Oaminetti v. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. Co.,
22 Cal.2d 344, 351-352 [139 P.2d 908].)
[8] While ditIerent causes of action were involved in the
present proceeding and the one leading to the order approving the rehabilitation agreement, the parties were the same,
and it is settled that even though the causes of action be
different, the prior determination of an issue is conclusive
iII. a subsequent suit between the same parties as to that issue
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and every matter which might have been urged to sustain
or defeat its determination. (Shore v. Shore, 43 Ca1.2d 677.
682 [277 P.2d 400] ; Krier v. Kt'ier, 28 Ca1.2d 841, 843 [172
P.2d 681] ; De Hart v. Allen, 26 Ca1.2d 829, 831 [161 P.2d
453]; Estate of Keet, 15 Ca1.2d 328, 334 [100 P.2d 1045]:
Sutphin v. Speik, 15 Ca1.2d 195, 201 et seq. [99 P.2d 652.
101 P.2d 497] ; Carninetti v. Board of Trustees, 1 Ca1.2d 354,
356 [34 P.2d 1021] ; Price v. Sixth District Ag1'i. Assn., 201
Cal. 502, 510 et seq. [258 P. 387].) Inconsistent language
found in certain opinions of the District Court of Appeal
must be disapproved. (Green v. Green, 66 Cal.App.2d 50, 59
[151 P.2d 679] ; Babcock v. Babcock, 63 Cal.App.2d 94, 97
[146 P.2d 279] ; Bank of America v. McLaughlin, 22 Cal.App.
2d 411, 417 [71 P.2d 291, 72 P.2d 554].) [9a] The basic
issue before the court when the agreement was submitted for
approval was the propriety of each of its provisions, and
the determination of that issue is conclusive as to every matter
which might have been urged to sustain or defeat its determination.
.It is contended that the order approving the rehabilitation
agreement may be collaterally attacked upon the theory that
the mutualization procedure provided for in the agreement
followed the wrong statutory provisions and that therefore
the order is void. For the purpose of passing upon this question we shall assume, contrary to what we have just decided,
that the wrong statutes were used in the mutualization of
the new company.
[10] It is the general rule that a final judgment or order
is res judicata even though contrary to statute where the
court has jurisdiction in the fundamental sense, i. e., of the
subject matter and the parties. [11] In the consideration
of problems arising in this field it should be kept in mind
that there is a difference between lack of jurisdiction in the
fundamental sense, which is ordinarily essential for collateral
attack, and the broader meaning of the term "lack of jurisdiction" when used in determining the availability of prohibition or certiorari to review an order or judgment. Some cases
involving collateral attack have unfortunately failed to recognize this distinction. (For discussion of the distinction, see
Abelleira v. District' Court of Appeal, 17 Ca1.2d 280, 287-291
[109 P.2d 942, 132 A.L.R. 715] ; Tide lVater Assoc. O'll boo
v. Superior Court, 43 Ca1.2d 815, 821 [279 P.2d 35])
[12] In some instances the requirements of a statute may
relate to subject matter jurisdicti(\n, and disregard of the

'j
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statute may render a judgment void and subject to collateral
attack. (See, for example, Grannis v. Superior Court, 146
Cal. 245, 254-255 [79 P. 891, 106 Am.St.Rep. 23] ; cf. Rogers
v. Oady, 104 Cal. 288, 291-292 [38 P. 81, 43 Am.St.Rep. 100]
.[ constitutional provision].) [13] In the present case, however, it is clear that the court which approved the rehabilitation agreement had jurisdiction of the subject matter and
the parties, and, unless the case comes within some exception,
collateral attack cannot be based on the ground that the court
authorized mutualization to proceed under the wrong statute.
[14] Closely analogous to the problem involved here are
cases holding that probate decrees are res judicata, althougb
they direct distribution pursuant to wills which are contrary
to statute, since the court sitting in probate, like a court
passing upon a rehabilitation agreement, is under a duty to
determine the validity of the instrument before it. (Estat8
of Loring, 29 Ca1.2d 423, 427 et seq. [175 P.2d 524] ; Orew v.
Pratt, 119 Cal. 139, 147 at seq. [51 P. 38] ; Estate of Gardiner,
45 Cal.App.2d 559, 562 et seq. [114 P.2d 643] ; McGavin v.
San Francisco P.O.A. Soc., 34 Cal.App. 168, 170 et seq. [167
P. 182].) [15] Similarly analogous are cases holding that
an order settling a trustee's account is res judicata as to the
propriety of the purchase of investment certificates which
were issued contrary to statute. (W~"Zlson v. Security-First
Nat. Bank, 21 Ca1.2d 705 [134 P.2d 800] ; Estate of Orane,
73 Cal.App.2d 93 l165 P.2d 940] ; cf. Fergodo v. Donohue,
40 Cal.App. 670 [181 P. 819].) Estats of Rowe, 66 Cal.
App.2d 594 [152 P.2d 765], which is contrary to the cases
cited above, is disapproved.
[16] The principle of res judicata has also been applied
as a basis for holding that judgments enforcing contracts
are a bar to the defense of illegality in subsequent litigation.
(.t11ldrews v. Re·idy, 7 Ca1.2d 366 [60 P.2d 832] ; De Hart v.
Allen, 49 Cal.App.2d 639, 646 [122 P.2d 273], approved in
De Hart v. Allen, 26 Ca1.2d 829, 830-831 [161 P.2d 453];
cf. Short v. Short, 106 Cal.App. 210, 215 [288 P. 1111].)
Another instance in which the doctrine was applied is San
Diego Trust &- Sav. Banlc v. Young, 19 Ca1.2d 98 [119 P.2d
133], where the prior judgment reduced the time for redemption contrary to statute. The San Diego case impliedly overruled Anthony v. •Janssen, ]83 Cal. 329 [191 P. 538], and
Tonnil1gsen v. Odd Fellows' Ocmetcry ..issn., 60 Cal.App.
568 [213 P. 710]. It has also been held that a judgment,
which was contrary to the Constitution because it was based

I
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--------------------------------------------.---upon a statute later held invalid, was nevertheless res judicata
in a subsequent suit, the court stating that objections to the
statute should have been raise,d in the prior proceeding.
(Chicot Co·unty Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308
U.S. 371, 376, 378 [60 8. Ct. 317, 319-320, 84 L.Ed. 329].)
The Chi cot case is quoted with approval in Mueller v. Elba
Oil Co., 21 Ca1.2d 188, 205-206 [130 P.2d 961], and was cited
in Rescue Army v. Municipal COU1"t, 28 Ca1.2d 460, 463-464
[171 P.2d 8].
There are some recognized exceptions to the general rule
that collateral attack will not be allowed where there is fundamental jurisdiction even though the judgment is contrary to
statute. [17] For example, a judgment may be collaterally
attacked where unusual circumstances were present which
prevented an earlier and more appropriate attack. (See 1
Witkin, California Procedure (1954), 411-412.) In B-urtnett
v. King, 33 Ca1.2d 805 [205 P.2d 657, 12 A.L.R.2d 333],
collateral attack was permitted against a default divorce
decree which awarded all the community property to the
plaintiff in the absence of a prayer therefor in the complaint,
contrary to the provision in section 580 of the Code of Civil
Procedure that relief in a default case cannot exceed that
demanded in the complaint. The defendant in the divorce
action had no notice or warning that the property would be
affected by a default judgment, and the opinion points out
that the decision would sanction a trap if it held that his
property rights had been disposed of since he would properly
have assumed from the complaint that his rights to the property were not to be litigated at that time. (33 Ca1.2d at p.
811.) The present case is readily distinguishable, since there
was nothing to prevent the questions which are raised with
regard to the validity of the rehabilitation agreement from
being litigated in the proceedings which led to the order
approving the agreement.
[18] Proceedings to prohibit or annul judgments of contempt for violation of injunctions and other equitable orders
made contrary to statute may constitute another exception to
the general rule. (Ha1'lan v. Superior Court, 94 Cal.App.2d
902, 904-905 [211 P.2d 942] ; Hunter v. Superior COU1't, 36
Cal.App.2d 100 [97 P.2d 492]; ct. Fortenbury v. Superior
Court, 16 Ca1.2d 405, 407-408 [l06 P.2d 411] [violation of
Constitution].) The decisions do not use the term, but
the attaek in such cases might be considered to be collateral,
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and the proceedings apparently fall in a special category
because they are penal in nature.
[9b] From the foregoing discussion it follows that, even
if we assume that the rehabilitation agreement and the order
approving it authorized mutualization of the new company
unt[er the wrong statutes, the order is nevertheless res judicata.
The next problem is whether there was sufficient compliance
with the statutory requirements for voluntary mutualization
of solvent insurers. Sections 11525 et seq. provide. that the
plan of mutualization shall be adopted by the directors and
approved by the shareholders, the commissioner and the policyholders. Plaintiffs contend that the actions taken to meet
these requirements were in certain respects defective and
unauthorized.
The approval of the shareholders to the plan of mutualization was given in the rehabilitation agreement by Commissioner Carpenter as sole stockholder of the new company. As
we have seen, the agreement provided for the formulation of
a plan of mutualization by the price determination committee,
and plaintiffs claim that the commissioner, acting for the
shareholders of the new company, was without authority to
give advance consent to such a plan. [19] In the absence
of statutory provision to the contrary, the stockholders of a
solvent company can contract to consent to a future plan
of voluntary mutualization (cl. Market St. Ry. 00. v. Hellman, 109 Cal. 571, 586-587 [42 P. 225]), and no sound reason
appears why such an agreement is improper merely because
the shares are held by the commissioner as conservator of
a seized insurer. The commissioner apparently concluded that
a plan for mutualization which could not be destroyed by
future action or nonaction of the shareholders was necessary
as a means of inducing both former and prospective policyholders to deal with the new company and thus permit its
continned e-ristence. [201 The nowers vested in the comautfiorize him, as s01e stoclillolaer, to give aavance consen~
to the plan of mutualization. Moreover, the validity of all
portions of the rehabilitation agreement, including the provision for advance consent, is res judicata.
The directors adopted the mutualization plan, but it is
claimed that the action taken was ineffective because they
assertedly did not obtain sufficient information to enable them
to properly evaluate the desirability of the plan. [21] They
had the benefit of the report of the price determination comto
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mittee and the opinions of experts, including actuaries and
officers of the company, and it seems obvious that, as a practical matter, directors must ordinarily act on the advice of
corporate officers and other persons who have expert knowledge. (See Ballantine & Sterling, California Corporation
Laws (1949), p. 110.)
After the directors adopted the plan as formulated by
the price determination committee, Commissioner Downey
held a hearing which lasted nearly three weeks. Oral and
documentary evidence was received, and all interested parties
had an opportunity to participate. The commissioner approved the plan after finding that the rights and interests
of the new company, its policyholders and shareholders were
protected and that the plan would be fair and equitable in
its operation. Plaintiffs contend that the findings are not
supported by the evidence and that there was a lack of procedural due process at the hearing. In passing upon these
contentions, we shall first give consideration to plaintiffs'
claim that the trial court, in reviewing the action of the commissioner, should have held a trial de novo. [22] The
approval of the mutualization plan by the commissioner did
not involve any deprivation of property rights or vested
rights; it was in essence a permit or license authorizing the
new company to purchase its own stock. Under these circumstances the function of the superior court was to determine
whether the action taken by the commissioner was arbitrary
or constituted an abuse of discretion, and in upholding the
action of the commissioner, it properly refused to conduct a
trial de novo. (Southern Calif. Jockey Club, Inc. v. California
etc. Racing Board, 36 Ca1.2d 167, 174-175 [223 P.2d 1J;
McDonough v. Goodcell, 13 Ca1.2d 741, 746-749 [91 P.2d 1035,
123 A...L.R. 12051 ; see Thomas v. California Emp. Stab. Com.,

[23] There is llU merit in plaintiftr;: claim trJ.al tIl!; rl~corQ
before the commissioner does not support his approval of the
plan. The price determination committee consisted of men
highly skilled in matters of insurance company valuation,
and they were assisted in the formulation of the plan by
Joseph Christman, associate actuary of the Metropolitan Life
Insurance Company of New York, two Fellows of the Society
of Actuaries, and numerous trained supervisory and clerical
employees. Experts testified that the price fixed for the
purchase of the stock was fair, that the provisions relating
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to the time and manner of payment were necessary for the
safety and stability of the new company, that the proposed
plan gave due regard and protection to the rights of all persons
interested in the new company and would be fair in its
operation.
",
[24] Plaintiffs' contention that there was a denial of procedural due process is based on their claim that the commissioner accepted the conclusions of the price determination
committee without having before him all the facts on which
those conclusions were based and that the committee itself
relied on statistics furnished by its actuary without reviewing
all the supporting data. Two members of the price determination committee testified in detail as to how the committee
arrived at its determinations, and the actuary testified regarding his report which was introduced in evidence. Thus two
of the four members of the committee who were responsible
for its report, as well as the actuary who procured most of
the data relied on by the committee, were available for crossexamination. These men, as we have seen, were experts in
the insurance and investment fields, and the fact that the
other members of the committee and the persons who assisted
the actuary were not called as witnesses is immaterial, at
least in the absence of a showing that plaintiffs sought to
obtain their testimony. (City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 33 Ca1.2d 908, 919 [207 P.2d 17].) At the hearing an
offer was made to furnish the documents and testimony necessary to explain every detail of the committee's work. No
claim is made that any request for data was refused, and
plaintiffs have no valid basis for complaint if they failed
to make such a request.
The judgment is affirmed.
Shenk, J., Spence, J., and Wood (Fred B.), J. pro tem.,.
concurred.
TRA YNOR, J.-I dissent.
Although the Legislature has provided detailed statutory
provisions for the mutualization of the business of an insolvent
insurer (Ins. Code, § 1045 et seq.), the majority opinion holds
in effect that these provisions may be completely nullified
by the execution of a rehabilitation agreement under section
1043 of the Insurance Code, if such agreement provides for
the voluntary mutualization of a new insurer created for
• A Hiped

Iv Ohai.rma.n

of Judicial Council.
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the purpose of carrying on the business of the old. The
commissioner has broad powers in executing rehabilitation
agreements, and it may be both proper and desirable for
him to make use of a new corporate entity to salvage the
business of an insolvent insurer. It does not follow, however,
that if the end product of a rehabilitation agreement is to
be the mutualization of the business of an insolvent insurer,
the statutory provisions with respect to such mutualization
may be ignored. To hold that they may be not only renders
the provisions with respect to involuntary mutualization
superfluous but deprives the interested parties of their right
to the protection of court scrutiny of the plan of mutualization.
(See Ins. Code, § 1051.)
The importance to the shareholders of the old company
of having the court independently pass upon the fairness of
the plan of mutualization is demonstrated by the facts of this
case. The trial court clearly indicated that had the decision
been his, the plan would not have been approved i if the
shareholders were entitled to his independent judgment, their
rights have been prejudiced by his failure to exercise it.
This case is not one involving only the mutualization of a
solvent insurer, since if it were, the shareholders would have
the power to protect their interests by withholding their
consent to the plan of mutualization. (Ins. Cod~, § 11526,
subd. (b).) In fact, the business of an insolvent insurer
is being mutualized pursuant to a rehabilitation agreement
that has deprived the shareholders of the old company of
the veto power they otherwise would have, and under the
holding of the majority opinion they must look to the commissioner rather than to the court for the protection of their
interests. (Ins. Code, §§ 11526, subd. (c), 11527.) Although
the Legislature recognized that approval by the commissioner
is sufficient when all of the interested parties are in a position to protect their own interests, it also provided that court
approval is essential when they are not. (Ins. Code, § 1051.)
Despite the force of the foregoing considerations, if in fact
the trial court in 1936 approved a rehabilitation agreement
that not only provided for mutualization contrary to the
statutory provisions but also restricted the power of that
court to control the ultimate disposition of the assets in the
hands of the commissioner as conservator or liquidatbr, I
would reluctantly concur in the judgment on the ground that
the validity of the agreement and order is res judicata. In
my opinion, however, the court in 1936 did not exhaust its

)
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power to control the disposition of assets in the hands of the
commissioner as conservator or liquidator (se'd Ins. Code,
§ 1037, subd. (d» and that therefore the commissioner cannot
carry out the terms of the mutualization agreement until as
liquidator he has secured the permission of the court in the
"insolvency proceedings. Accordingly, until he secures that
approval he cannot approve the plan presented by the price
determination committee as "fair and equitable in its operation" (Ins. Code, § 11527), for it cannot be known whether
it will become operative at all until it is approved by the
court in the insolvency proceedings.
Subdivision Cd) of section 1037 provides "that no transaction involving real or personal property shall be made where
the market value of the property involved exceeds the sum
of one thousand dollars without first obtaining permission
01 . • • [the court in the insolvency proceedings], and then
only in accordance with such terms as said court may prescribe. " The stock of the new company subject to the plan
of mutualization is personal property worth more than $1.000,
and that plan is clearly a transaction involving &uch property.
This section has not been complied with unless the court in
approving the rehabilitation agreement granted permission
to the commissioner to dispose of the stock under the terms
of any mutualization agreement that might be proposed by
the price determination committee 10 years or more in the
future.
The order approving the rehabilitation agreement is ambiguous. Paragraph 15 provides:
"That the Insurance Commissioner of the State of California as Conservator of respondent corporation, or, if he
should hereafter be appointed J.Jiquidator of said corporation,
as such Liquidator, be and is hereby authorized, without
further order of this court, fully and faithfully to perform,
carry out, and dIscharge each and all of the obligations, terms,
conditions, and covenants on his part required to be performed under the terms of said Rehabilitation and Reinsurance Agreement; and, either with or without further order
of this court, to make, do, execute, and deliver any and all
stlch further or other acts, deeds, and things by him deemed
reasonably necessary or desirable to effectuate the intents and
purposes of said Rehabilitation and Reinsurance Agreement.
and to assure and to confirm to Pacific Mutual Life Insurance
Company, or its successors, an and singular the properties
hereinbefore directed to be COll veyed and released to said
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corporation, and to enable said corporation from and after
the date hereof to conduct and continue to condnct a life
and disability insurance business, as contemplated by said
agreement. "
Paragraph 16 provides:
"That this court, without relinquishing by these specific
provisions any jurisc1ietion by it retained as a matter of law,
do, and it does hereby, specifically retain and reserye jurisdiction of the within proeeedings (for the purpose of authorizing or approving any act of the Insurance Commissioner of
the State of California done, or to bc <lone pursuant to or in
accordance with this order, and) for the purpose of making
or entering, upon application of the Insurance Commissioner
of the State of California or of Pacific Mutual Life Insurance
Company, any order, decree, judgment, or ruling required,
permitted, or requested to be done, made, or entered in con·
nection with or pursuant to the terms of said agreement, or
for the effectuation of the purposes thereof."
Since the contemplated plan of mutualization was not to
be formulated for at least 10 years, the court could obviously
not approve that plan at the time it entered its order approving the rehabilitation agreement. Moreover, it did not
expressly approve in advance the carrying out of any mutualization plan that might be presented by the price determination committee. Although standing alone the language
permitting the commissioner to carry out the rehabilitation
agreement "without further order of this court" might be
interpreted as exhausting the court '8 jurisdiction over mutualization, it may not reasonably be so interpreted in the
light of the express reservation of jurisdiction "for the purpose of making . . . any order . . . required . . . in connection with or pursuant to the terms of said agreement."
It is significant that in Carpenter v. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. Co.,
10 Ca1.2d 307, 322 [74 P.2d 761], this court was careful to
note: "The plan also provides that the commissioner, either
as conservator or liquidator, shall continue to hold all the
stock of the new company as a protection to all old company
policyholders. Ultimate mutualization, in the event the policyholders so elect is also provided for. The trial court reserves jurisdiction over the entire proceeding." Parag~aphs
] 5 and 16 may be reconciled by interpreting them as authorizing the commissioner without further order of the court to
carry out the rehabilitation ar,reement to the extent that its
provisions represented a completed plan for rehabilitation and

734

PAOIFIC MUT. LIFE INS. CO. V. MCCONNELL

L44 C.2d

reinsurance, and at the same time reserving to the court jurisdiction to approve or disapprove plans to be developed in
the future for mutualization or other disposal of the stock
in the hands of the commissioner. Such an interpretation
Qf the order subserves the primary purpose of section 1037.
subdivision (d), and the statutes governing involuntary mutualization by securing to all interested parties their right to
court scrutiny of all steps in the proceedings that substantially
affect their rights, and since the order is reasonably susceptible
of that interpretation it should be adopted. Although the
validity of the rehabilitation agreement and the order approving it are res judicata, the interpretation of the order is not
res judicata, and it ~hould not be interpreted to sanction
further departures from the statutory provisions than res
judicata compels. (See lVatson v. Lawson, 166 Cal. 235. 242
[135 P. 961]; Treece v. Treece, 125 Cal.App. 726, 728 [14
P.2d 95].)
The judgment should be reversed.
Schauer, J., concurred.
CARTER, J .-1 dissent.
rfhe majority opinion is a masterpiece of legal legerdemain.
It approves a trallsaction whereby the policyholders of old
company are deprived of between $18,000,000 and $24,000,000
to which they are entitled under any concept of law and
justice. It also deprives the stockholders of old company of
whatever value their stock in old company may be worth in
view of the fact that the assets of old company which were
transferred to new company at the time of its creation were
valued in excess of over $200,000,000. The majority concedes
that new company was created in an insolvency proceeding
and has always been used in said proceeding as an agency
of the illsurance commissioner for the purpose of rehabilitating
an insolvent insurance company, and that such proceeding is
still pending because rehabilitation has not been completed.
It nevertheless holds that "the new company is solvent and
nondeliqucnt," even though it owes and is obligated to pay
the policyholders of old company between $18,000,000 and
$24,000.000 whieh it admittedly is not financially able to pay.
In approvillg this transaction the majority disregards express
statutory provisions of this state and deprives the stockholders
and policyholders of old company of their right to a judicial
review of the administrative proceeding whereby they were
deprived of their property, thus denyini them due process

June 1955]

PACIFIC MUT. LIFE

INS. Co. v. MCCONNELL

735

[44 C.2d 715: 285 P.2d 6361

of law to which they are entitled under both state and federal
constitutional provisions.
THE UNDENIABLE FACTS

On July 22, 1936, some 3,000 stockholders and 300,000
policyholders of The Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company
of California, hereinafter known as old company, were stunned
by the news that the insurance commissioner had taken charge
of the company, alleging it to be insolvent. This development
was all the more shocking because of its suddenness and also
because only a short time before, the regular, verified, annual
statement of the company showed it to be in sound financial
condition, as had similar previous statements from year to
year consistently shown throughout its lifetime of over 68
years. The business and assets of old company were then
taken over by the insurance commissioner of this state pursuant to the provisions of sections 1011 and 1013 of the Insurance Code. Thereafter, The Pacific Mutual Life Insurance
Company was organized as part of a plan of rehabilitation
of old company by the commissioner who purchased its entire
capital stock with assets of old company. Pursuant to section
1043 of the Insurance Code, a "Rehabilitation and Reinsurance" agreement was entered into between the new company
and the then insurance commissioner, as conservator of old
company. The rehabilitation plan provided for the organization of a new corporation with a capital of $1,000,000 which
consisted of 10,000 shares at a par value of $100 each. The
commissioner was to purchase all the outstanding stock of
the new company with $3,000,000 in cash belonging to the old
company (which gave new company an initial surplus of
$2,000,000). The commissioner was then to transfer all the
other assets of old company (with the exception of the stock
of new company which, of course, was owned by old company)
to new company, and new company was to assume all policies
and obligations of the old company to the extent provided for
in the plan. The plan provided that new company would
assume all the obligations of the old company under existing
policies with the exception of the non-can policies, which
obligations were assumed on a reduced benefit schedule at
the old premium rates. It was agreed that further benefits
would be restored out of certain designated income of new
company. All of new company's stock was purchased with
$3,000,000 out of old company's funds. In addition, all the
other assets of old ~mpany (over $200,000,000 assets in addi-
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tion to going agency organization and concern, good will,
etc., "worth several millions of dollars" (Carpenter v. Pacific
Mut. L. Ins. Co., 10 Ca1.2d 307, 325 [74 P.2d 761]) were
transferred to new company. Therefore, new company owes
.its creation and existence to old company. The confiscatory
nature of this entire proceeding, including the present majority holding, is at once apparent when we see that old
company's stockholders will ultimately only receive $3,000,000
for their stock which, when old company was taken over, was
supported by that amount in cash plus over $200,000,000 in
various assets plus the value of good will, going business
organization, etc., worth several millions of dollars! The
agreement thus provided for a transfer to new company of
the assets of old company (with certain exceptions not relevant
here) and the assumption by new company of the obligations
of old company, excluding certain noncancellable policies.
With regard to these policies, known as the" non-can" policies,
new company assumed a limited obligation and agreed to set
up a special fund for the restoration of benefits thereunder.
This obligation is still unpaid and outstanding. The capital
stock of new company was to be held by the commissioner,
as conservator, or liquidator, for the benefit of the creditors,
policyholders, and stockholders of old company. On December 4, 1936, the agreement was approved by the trial court.
In Carpenter v. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. Co., 10 Ca1.2d 307, 332,
334 [74 P.2d 761 (affirmed Neblett v. Carpenter, 305 U.S.
297 [59 8.Ct. 170, 83 L.Ed. 182]), it was held that the
organization of new company, as part of a plan to rehabilitate
the business of old company was proper. It is pointed out
(p. 322) that "Ultimate mutualization, in the event the policyholders so elect is also provided for."
On February 2, 1937, an order was made providing for
the liquidation of the old company and appointing the insurance commissioner as liquidator. This order was upheld on
appeal (Carpenter v. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. Co., 13 Cal.2d 306
[89 P.2d 637]), although old company has never been dissolved. On April 4, 1938, the commissioner, as liquidator,
transferred title to the capital stock of new company to
voting trustees. This transfer was upheld on appeal (Caminetti v. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. Co., 22 Ca1.2d 344 [139 P.2d
908]). (Other aspects of this case have been decided by
this court in Caminetti v. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. Co., 22 Ca1.2d
77 [136 P.2d 779] ; Carninetti v. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. Co., 22
Cal.2d 386 [139 P.2d 930]; Cam'inetti v. Pacific M'Ut. L.lm.
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00., 23 Ca1.2d 94 [142 P.2d 741] j Neblett v. Pacific Mut. L.
Ins. Co., 22 Ca1.2d 393 [139 P.2d 934] ; Carpenter v. Pacific
Mut. L. Ins. Co., 14 Ca1.2d 704. [96 P.2d 796] ; and by the
appellate courts in Sanborn v. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. Co., 42
Cal.App.2d 99 [108 P.2d 458] j Gan-ison v. Pacific Mut. L.
Ins. Co., 83 Cal.App.2d 1 [187 P.2d 893].)
New company now seeks to acquire its stock (see later discussion) through the device of mutualization under section
20 (a) of the rehabilitation agreement. The mutualization
plan provides that the price to be paid for new company's
stock is $3,000,000, with simple interest. If non-can benefits
are fully restored prior to January 1, 1973, the purchase price
is to be increased by an additional sum of $250,000 for each
full year by which the date of completion of restoration precedes December, 1973. The purchase price is not absolutely
payable, but is to be paid only "when and if" all the following conditions are met: (1) Non-can restoration is completed;
(2) the funds in a special surplus fund (to be created pursuant to the plan) plus the capital and surplus of new company, equal or exceed the purchase price of the stock; (3)
the financial cond#ion of the new company is such that, after
paying for and cancelling the stock, it would still have admitted assets in excess of all its liabilities amounting to the
sum of 4 per cent of all admitted assets plus 25 per cent of
the premiums collected during the preceding calendar year
on all group insurance written on a one-year term basis and
on all accident and health insurance.
This resume shows that the new company was brought into
existence as a creature of the state to rehabilitate old company
and to carryon its business for that purpose. It also shows
the grievous injustice being perpetuated by the majority in
approving the plan of mutualization used here-that of voluntary mutualization of an insolvent corporation. This type
of voluntary mutualization is as voluntary as a confession
given under force, duress, and threats of bodily injury. Noncan benefits have not been fully restored; even under the
mutualization plan it is contemplated they will not be fully
restored (if partial benefit payments can be considered "full"
restoration) until 1973. Until such time as they are restored,
new company cannot be considered as a solvent concern since
it still owes a debt to the policyholders and stockholders of
old company, which it admittedly cannot now pay. The
amount of this debt is conceded to be between $18,000,000
and $24,000,000. How can it then be said, with any degree
44C.2d-J6
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of honesty whatsoever, that new company is solvent and may
avail itself of the statutory provisions relating to mutualiza.
tion f I defy anyone to give an affirmative answer to this
question.
tI.

PRESENT PROCEEDING

Purporting to act under paragraph 20 (a) of the rehabilitation and reinsurance agreement, a t>lan of mutualization
was formulated by the committee and, on September 22, 1950,
the insurance commissioner found that the plan protected the
rights and interests of new company, its policyholders and
shareholders, and that he was satisfied that the plan would
be fair and equitable in its operation.
Paragraph 20(a) of the rehabilitation and reinsurance
agreement provides:
"Mutualization and Disposition of Stock of New Company
"(2) Neither the Conservator, nor, if one be appointed,
the Liquidator, of the Old Company, shall dispose of any of
the stock of the New Company except as follows:
"(a) At any time between July 1, 1946 and January 1,
1948, and thereafter so long as the Conservator or a Liquidator
of the Old Company may continue to hold any or all of said
stock, ten percent (10%) of the holders of participating
policies of life insurance entitled to vote at a policy holders'
election on a proposal for voluntary mutualization of the New
Company, whether those re-insured hereunder or those issued
by the New Company (each policy holder for this purpose
being regarded as one person regardless of the number of
policies owned or amount of insurance held) may request
the New Company to create an Appointing Committee as
hereinafter provided to exercise the duties and functions hereinafter specified in respect of a proposed voluntary mutualization of the New Company, in accordance with the laws of
the State of California in effect at the time of said request,
or, if said laws then so permit, of anyone or more departments thereof. Such request shall specify the department or
departments of the New Company desired to be mutualized.
"Upon the receipt of such request the New Company shall
c.eate an Appointing Committee consisting of the then President of the Association of Life Insurance Presidents, the
President of Leland Stanford Jr. University, and the Provost
of the University of California at Los Angeles, or persons
occupying similar positions if their or any of their titles
shall have been changed. In the event anyone or more of
such persons shall refuse or be unable to act, the rema,injns
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member or members shall fill the vacancy or vacancies thereby
created by their appointment in writing of another person
or persons of similar position and standing. If all of said
persons refuse or are unable to act, the Court or any Judge
thereof shall, on the application of the Commissioner. designate an A.ppointing Committee consisting of three (3)
persons of similar position and standing. Said Appointing
Committee, acting through not less than a majority of its
members, shall designate a Price Determination Committee
of not less than three and not more than five (5) persons
skilled in matters of insurance company valuation, which
committee, acting through not less than a majority thereof,
shall determine whether in their opinion the proposed voluntary mutualization of the New Company, or of the department
or departments tnereof specified in said request can then be
practicably accomplished having due 1'egard to the interests
of aU persons interested in the New Company.· If it can
be determined that such mutualization is not then practicable
no further steps shall be taken in connection with a possible
mutualization of the New Company under the provisions of
this subparagraph until at least six months after the date of
such determination. If in the opinion of a majority of the
members of the committee such mutualization is then practicable, the committee shall determine the proper price to be
paid upon such mutualization and appropriate terms of payments thereof; said determination shall not be made, however,
prior to January 1, 1947.
"If, at the date of the appointment of such committee
the New Company shall have in force Participating Life
Insurance written subsequent to the effective date of this
agreement in an amount in excess of its Non-Participating
Life Insurance written during the same period, one-half (112)
of such excess shall, for the purpose of fixing the proper
price to be paid (but for no other purpose) be deemed to be,
and shall be valued as, Non-Participating Life Insurance.
If at the time of such appointment, there shall have been
transferred from the Participating Department in accordance
with the provisions of sub-paragraph (d) of paragraph 6
hereof, less than ten percent (10%) of the then accrued
earnings described therein, or if there shall have been tl'ansferred to the Participating Department any working capital
pursuant to the provisions of subparagraph (c) of said para-The statutory scheme relating to insolvent companies is concerned
with the protection of those interested in the insolven' eompan7.
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graph 6, any unpaid balance thereof shall, for the purpose
of fixing the proper price to be paid (but for no other purpose) be deemed to be a debt then due and matured. Said
Committee shall in its report to the New Company include a
wan of mutualization of the New Company, or of the department or departments thereof spccified in said request of the
policy holders_ Such plan shall specify, in addition to any
other relevant matters, the price to be paid, the terms of
payment, and the persons by whom and the manner in which
the right to vote the stock of the New Company is to be exercised pending complete payment of the purchase price. In
this connection the said Committee, if it deem it advisable,
may provide in the plan for the creation of a voting trust,
designate the initial trustees, and make provision for the
appointment of their successors. Unless the benefits under
Non-Can policies have theretofore been fully restored and
claims against the Liquidator fully paid, such plan shall
further provide that such mutualization shall not affect the
provisions of paragraph 17 or of paragraph 14 hereof or
the right of holders of Non-Can Policies to the restoration of
benefits from the sources and in the manner therein provided.
"The New Company agrees that within sixty (60) days
after the making of such report (unless said report shall be
to the effect that mutnalization is not then practicable)
it will mail copies thereof to all of its policy holders entItled
to vote upon such plan or plans of mutualization if submitted
according to law. If within one hundred twenty (120) days
after the mailing of such notice, ten per cent. (10%) of the
policy holders cntitled to vote upon any such plan or plans
(each policy holder being for this purpose regarded as oue
person regardless of the number of policies owned or amount
of insurance held) shall request in writing the submission
thereof, the New Company will promptly submit the same
in accordance with the laws of the R!ate of California then
in effect. The Consc'rvator for himself and for any successors
in the ownership of said stock claiming under him in any
manner other than through a sale of said stock pursuant to
the provisions of subparagraph (d) hereof agrees to consent
and hereby consents as the holder and owner of the stock of
tIll' New Company to such plan of mutualization. In the event
said mutualization plan is adopted, the Conservator, or a
liquidator as aforesaid, shall dispose of such stock in accordancE' with such plan. 1'1Ie E'xpenses of the foregoing proceedings including costs, fees and expenses of the Price Deter-

..tune 1955] PACIFIC

MUT.

LIFE

INS.

Co.

tJ.

McCONNELL

741

[44 C.2d 715: 285 P.2d 636]

mination Committee, shall be borne by the New Company,
and unless the proposed plan of mutualization is consummated,
shall be charged to the Participatdng Department thereof.
"In the event the Price Determination Committee has been
appointed as herein provided prior to January 1, 1948. said
Committee shall have the power to extend the time within
which mutualization may be effected hereunder for such perioci
or periods of time as it may deem necessary for the orciE'rly
completion of mutualization proceedings as herein ordered."
(Emphasis added.)
MUTUALIZATION

The Insurance Code provides for mutualization of insurance companies in two different ways. Division 1, part 2,
chapter 1, article 14, sections 1010-1062, entitled "Proceedings in Cases of Insolvency and Delinquency" provides in
section 1043 for "Mutualization, reinsurance and rehabilitation." Division 2, part 2. chapter 13, article 1, sections 1152511533, entitled "Voluntary Mutualization of Incorporated
Life and Life and Disability Insurers Having a Capital Stock
and Issuing Nonassessable Policies on a Reserve Basis" provides in sections 11525 and 11526 the "Authorization to
mutualize" and the "Method of mutualization."
There is no dispute concerning the method actually used
in this proceeding. The rehabilitation plan provided for
"voluntary" mutualization and the matter proceeded under
sections 11525 and 11526. There is complete disagreement as
to which method should have been used. Appellants correctly
contend that the procedure outlined for "involuntary"
mutualization of an "insolvent" insurer is the only proper
method.
As stated in Carpenter v. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. Co., 10 Ca1.2d
807, 328 [74 P.2d 761], " .•• the proceedings here under
review were taken under sections 1010 to 1061 of the Insurance Code, adopted in 1935." (The other cases heretofore
cited have reiterated this statement.) The original seizure
of old company was accomplished under section 1011, subdivision (d). Section 1045 provides "Mutualization of life
insurer issuing nonassessable policies on a reverse basis: Formation of plan. If at any time after the issuance of an order
under section 1011 affecting a life insurer issuing nonaSSQSSable policies on a reserve basis and organized with a capital
stock evidenced by shares thereof it shall appear to the commissioner that the p'urposes of seclion 1011 ca11 be best attained
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by the mutualization of such life insurer, the commissioner
may /orm,ulate a plan for the mutualization of such insurer."

(Emphasis added.)
All proceedings heretofore had in this litigation have been
.. as provided for in article 14 relating to insolvent and de·linquent insurers. The rehabilitation agreement provides for
mutualization under the statutory scheme set up for solvent
insurers. The majority opinion states "The new company is
solvent and nondelinquent, and there is no sound reason why
it should be mutualized under the statutes relating to insolvent insurers. . . . Section 1043 [which relates to insolvents], which authorizes the commissioner to enter into rehabilitation agreements, contains no express limitation on
what may be included in them, and section 1037 [which also
relates to insolvents] provides that the enumeration of the
powers of the commissioner shall not be construed as a limitation upon him or upon his right to do such other acts as he
may deem necessary in connection with the handling of the
affairs of an insolvent company." (Emphasis added.) Thus
the majority opinion admits the procedure relating to insolvents was the one used and impliedly admits that it is the
correct procedure. However, in using the code sections relating to insolvents, the author then argues that these sections place no limitation upon the commissioner. Section
1037 provides that the powers and authority of the commissioner in proceedings "under this article" (which relates to
insolvents) shall not be construed as a limitation on his right
to act or to do that "which he may deem necessary or expedient for the accomplishment or in aid of the purpose of
such proceedings." Then, citing section 1043 (relating again
to insolvents), we are told that the new company was properly
organized by the commissioner who "evidently concluded"
that the protection of creditors and" other interested parties"
could best be accomplished through the formation of a new
company "divorced as far as possible from the control of
those who were in charge of the old company when it experienced financial difficulties." Then we are told that the
new company is a separate and distinct entity. We are told
this without any discussion of the character of new company, and with only the unreasoned and unsupported dictum
in Garrison v. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. 00., 83 Cal.App.2d 1,
9-10 [187 P.2d 893], as authority therefor.
Section 11525 (the procedure followed here) provides for

"Av.tlwrizati<m III mv,tv,aUz6.
\
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rated insurer having a paid-in -capital represented by outstanding shares of capital stock and issuing, on a reserve
basis, nonassessable policies of life insurance or of both life
and disability insurance, may convert itself into an incorporated mutual life insurer, or life and disability insurer,
issuing nonassessable policies on a reserve basis. To that
end it may provide and carry out a plan for the acquisition
of the outstanding shares of its capital stock for the benefit
of its policyholders, or any class or classes of its policyholders,
by complying with the requirements of this chapter." (Emphasis added.)
The question is thus directly posed as to whether new company falls within the classification of a "solvent" domestic
incorporated insurer which "may convert itself into an incorporated mutual life insurer" which "may provide and
carry out a plan for the acquisition of the outstanding shares
of its capital stock for the benefit of its policyholders. "
CHARACTER OF NEW COMPA.NY

New company was organized by the insurance commissioner
"with a name similar to that of the old company as a corporate agent to assist him in carrying on the business of the
old company" (Carpenter v. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. Co., 10
Ca1.2d 307, 324, 325 [74 P.2d 761]). It was also said there
(p. 327) that "The proceeding was had under sections
1010 to 1061 of the Insurance Code which specially deal with
the rehabilitation and liquidation of insurance companies.
Those sections set up a comprehensive statutory scheme to
accomplish those results. The proceeding is not one in which
another party is prosecuting another party at all. It is
simply a proceeding in which the state is invoking its power
over a corporate entity permitted by the state to engage in a
business vitally affected with the public interest upon condition of continuing compliance with the requirements provided by the state. It is not a controversy between private
parties but a proceeding by the state in the interest of the
public." See also Caminetti v. Pacific Mut. L. 1m. Co.,
22 Ca1.2d 77, 82 [136 P.2d 779], where it was held that
"The new company was the corporate agency of the Insurance Commissioner as conservator for the purpose of c0ntinuing and preserving the business of tke old compatWy."
(Emphasis added.)
The commissioner held, either as conservator or later as
liquidator, the entire capital stock of new company until

)
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1938 when it was transferred to voting trustees (Caminetti v.
Pacific Mut. L. Ins. Co., 22 Cal.2d 344, 356 [139 P.2d 908]).
It was there said that "The affairs of the new company are
placed in charge of a board of directors to whom the agree.ment expressly confides a large measure of discretion. Super-

visory powers, however, are reserved to the commissioner,
independent of and in addition to his statutory powers over
delinquent insurance companies. For example, no investment or reinvestment of the assets of the old company may
be made without written approval of the commissioner. Payments to the restoration fund for non-can policies are subject
to the approval of the commissioner who, in addition, may require further payments thereto. The determination by the
board of directors of the apportionment of expenses and the
exchange of assets among the several departments of the new
company is subject to adjustment by the commissioner. Reserves against policies of the old company subject to assumption or reinsurance under the agreement were to be established
by the new company with the approval of and in accordance
with the requirements of the commissioner. While as holder
of the stock the commissioner possessed the voting rights incident thereto, the agreement contains no express provision
with respect to the exercise of the voting power. . . .
"The trustees are given legal title to the stock of the new
company with the power to exercise all the rights of ownership. The commissioner, however, retains the entire beneficial
interest for the benefit of creditors of the old company and
others interested. The voting trust undertakes to transfer to
the trustees only administrative duties relating to the stock,
principally the right to vote the same• ••. " (Emphasis
added.)
New company does not possess the characteristics of a solvent company as that term is generally understood. First,
it was organized as the agent of the commissioner to rehabilitate the business of the old company. It may be, as was said
in the Garrison case, that it is a distinct entity without detracting in the least from the fact that it is still an agent for
the purpose of rehabilitating the old company. An agent, or
servant, is usually a distinct entity, but the duties and activities of sueh agent or servant, are carried out to serve the
purposes of the principal. In other words, the agent acts for
the principal, not for himself, or itself. Does the insurance
commissioner ordinarily, and customarily, hold all the stock
of a solvent insurance company 1 Does the insurance commis-
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sioner ordinarily, and customarily, have reserved to himself
supervisory powers, "independent of and in addition to his
statutory powers" where a solvent company is concerned'
Does an insurance commissioner ordinarily, and customarily,
give his written approval of the investment or reinvestment
of funds of a solvent insurance company? Does the insurance
commissioner ordinarily, and customarily, tell the board of
directors of a solvent company when and how they must apportion expenses and exchange assets among its several departments Y In the case of new company, the commissioner
does all of those things. (See Chief Justice Gibson's opinion
in Oaminetti v. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. 00., 22 Ca1.2d 344, 356
(139 P.2d 908].)
New company would have no existence had it not been for
the technical insolvency of old company. No new money constituted the assets of new company which was organized with
the assets of old company. If new company were a solvent
independent and distinct corporation, the insurance commissioner would not be holding its stock for the policyholders of
old company. The stockholders of new company would be holding their own stock supported by assets in the hands of the
officers and directors of the company. Section 11525 provides
that" A solvent domestic incorporated insurer [is one] having
a paid-in capital represented by outstanding shares of capital
stock and issuing, on a reserve basis, nonassessable policies of
life insurance or of both life and disability insurance. • . ."
Surely in the normal case, "outstanding shares of capital
stock" refers to stock held by stockholders, not by the commissioner!
Mr. Justice Traynor has pointed out how the use of the
solvent mutualization procedure has deprived the members of
old \.~ompany of their right to the protection of court scrutiny
of the plan of mutualization. He shows how the procedure used
here cannot apply to the facts of the case because in the ordinary case of a voluntary mutualization, the shareholders
would have the power to protect their interests by withholding
their consent to the plan of mutualization. The sections of
the code which relate to mutualization of insolvent companies
were clearly intended by the Legislature to protect the interests of the interested parties by providing for court approval.
In the present case by the use of the procedure provided
for in the case of a solvent company, the commissioner approves a plan to be formulated in the future. When that plan

)
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is formulated, as holder of all the stock, he votes for the plan.
Then, as commissioner, he approves the plan as fair and equitable. \Ve are told by the majority opinion that "it must be
assumed that the Legislature realized that the commissioner
might be required to pass upon the fairness of a plan in a case
where he, acting as conservator, had previously consented to
mutualization on behalf of the stockholders." Nothing of the
kind must be assumed. It is obvious from even a casual reading of the code provisions relating to insolvent companies
(1043 et seq.) and those relating to solvent companies (11525
et seq.) that the Legislature had not the faintest thought that
the two would be so commingled as they are in this case, or
that the commissioner would be placed in a position where he
was forced to approve a plan to be formulated some 10 years in
the future, then, when the plan was formulated forced to vote
an approval of it as a sole stockholder, and still later, to give
his approval of something he had theretofore twice before
approved.
Ever since the inception· of the receivership proceedings
and the organization of new company all the parties and
proceedings concerned in the rehabilitation matter have been
subject to the continuing jurisdiction and supervision of the
court. It has been pointed out in various phases of this litigation that new company was organized by the commissioner as
his corporate agent to rehabilitate the business of old company. Without the original proceeding under section 1011 (d)
of the Insurance Code, new company would not have come
into being.
It is necessary, next, to note the difference in methods provided for in the two divisions of the Insurance Code for
mutualization of insolvent and solvent companies.
Section 1046 provides that" Said mutualization plan [called
involuntary mutualization for insolvent companies and follows the section (1045) which provides: "If at any time after
the issuance of an order under section 1011" the II commissioner" shall formulate a plan of mutualization] shall include
provisions for:
"(a) rAcquisition of capital stock.] The acquisition by
such insurer of all outstanding shares of its capital stock at a
price and upon terms and conditions to be fixed as hereinafter
provided.
• (With the excepUOD. of the present proceedinK M be hereinafter
cWcused.)

)
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"(b) [Retirement of capital stock.] The retirement of said
shares of stock when acquired by such insurer.
"(c) [Amendment of charter.] The amendment of the
charter of such insurer so as to enable it to transact its business as a mutual insurer issuing nonassessable policies on a
reserve basis.
"(d) [Payment of claims.] The manner in which and the
time within which, after mutualization is effected, matured
and maturing claims against such insurer shall be paid to the
lawful holders thereof.
"(e) [Submission of plan to policyholders.] The submission of said mutualization plan to the policyholders of such
insurer under such procedure as shall be set forth in the plan
or prescribed by said court, for their approval or rejection.
"(f) [Notice to shareholders.] Notice to the shareholders
. of such insurer, in such manner and at such time after the
approval of said mutualization plan by said policyholders,
as the court may direct."
Section 1048 provides that after the formulation of the
mutualization plan, the commissioner shall submit it to the
court for its order directing the submission thereof to the
policyholders named in subdivision (e), of section 1046.
Section 11526 (relating to solvent insurers) provides that
"Such plan shall include appropriate proceedings for amending the insurer's articles of incorporation to give effect to the
acquisition, by said insurer, for the benefit of its policyholders
or any class or classes thereof, of the outstanding shares of
its capital stock and the conversion of the insurer from a
stock corporation into a nonstock corporation for the benefit
of its members. The members of such nonstock corporation
shall be the policyholders from time to time of the class or
classes for whose benefit the stock of the insurer was acquired,
and no other persons. Such plan shall be:
" (a) Adopted by a vote of a majority of the directors.
[As distinguished from the formation thereof by the commissioner as provided in section 1045.]
"(b) Approved by the vote of the holders of at least a
majority of the outstanding shares at a special meeting of
shareholders called for that purpose, or by the written consent of such shareholders. rAs dh,tinguished from section
1048 requiring the commissioner to obtain court approval
and an order of the court directing the submission of the plan
to the policylwldcrs.]
"(c) Submitted to the commissioner and approved by him

J
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in writing. [Under the circumstances here prevailing with
regard to the commissioner's position as conservator, liquidator and general supervisor of new company, this amounts
to an idle act.]
•
" (d) Approved by a majority vote of all the policyholder.
of the class or classes for whose benefit the stock is to be acquired voting at an election by the policyholders called for
that purpose, subject to the provisions of section 11528.•••
" (e) Filed in the office of the Insurance Commissioner
after having been approved as provided in subdivisions (b),
( c) and (d) of this section."
Under the provisions of the rehabilitation agreement, a
price determination committee consisting of four members was
set up. The price determination committee reported to new
company, in April, 1950, that mutualization was practicable
and valued the stock of new company at $3,000,000. The
mutualization plan provided in part for the payment of the
purchase price with simple interest at the rate of long term
government bonds (2%%). Under the terms of the rehabilitation agreement, "The Conservator for himself and
for any successors in the ownership of said stock claiming
under him in any manner other than through a sale of said
stock pursuant to the provisions of sub-paragraph (d) hereof
agrees to consent and hereby consents as the holder and owner
of the stock of the New Company to such plan of mutualization. In the event said mutualization plan is adopted, the
Conservator, or a Liquidator as aforesaid, shall dispose of
such stock in accordance with such plan."
Under the voluntary mutualization procedure heretofore set
forth (section 11526) the mutualization plan is submitted
to the commissioner after adoption by a vote of a majority of
the directors and after a vote by a majority of the outstanding shares at a special meeting of shareholders called
for that purpose. Section 11527- provides that "The Commissioner shall examine the plan submitted to him under the
provisions of subdivision (c) of section 11526. He shall not
approve s,ltch plan unless in his opinion the rights and interests of the insurer, its policyholders and shareholders are
protected nor unless he is satisfied that the plan will be fair
and equitable in its ope1·at-ion." (Emphasis added.) Fair
and equitable to which company'
Under the provision of the rehabilitation agreement heretofore set forth, the then commisRioner agreed for himself,
and his successors, to agree to any plan promulgated by the
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price determination committee. It should be borne in mind
that the stock of new company is now held by voting
trustees who had no discretioni but were (as stated in the
insurance commissioner's answering brief, p. 73) "not only
aut horized, but bound to give their consent; and [that] they
had no discretion to exercise." (Emphasis that of the commissioner.) There is evidence in the record which shows that
the trustees voted for the plan of mutualization because they
were told to so vote; that they did not examine into the
merits of the plan. The next step provided for in section
11526 (Ins. Code) is that the plan shall be submitted to the
commissioner for his written approval. The insurance commissioner states (Answering brief, p. 83), "As we have already shown, the Liquidator [commissioner] has bound himself to consent to a Plan of Mutualization proposed in accordance with the Rehabilitation Agreement." The code, however, (§ 11527) provides that the commissioner shall examine
the plan submitted to him under the provisions of subdivision
(c) of section 11526 and that "He shall not approve such
plan unless in his opinion the rights and interests of the in8urer, its policyholders and shareholders are protected nor
unless ke is satisfied that the plan will be fair and equitable
in its operation." (Emphasis added.) The net result, under
the circumstances prevailing in this case, is that the commissioner, as beneficial owner of all the stock of the new company,
instructs the voting trustees to vote for any plan proposed by
the price determination committee and then, when such plan
is submitted to him for his approval, places his rubber stamp
of approval thereon because he (or his predecessor) has, 10
years prior to the promulgation of the plan, agreed to approve
it no matter what it is-agreed, not only for himself, but for
any successor in office, to approve the plan as proposed. It is
shown, therefore, without a shadow of a doubt, that the
earlier agreement to approve any plan proposed by the price
determination committee has the effect of nullifying section
11527 of the Insurance Code, as well as the sections relating
to mutualization of insolvent insurers.
Had the procedure outlined in sections 1045, 1046 and 1048
been followed, the result would be very different. Under
section 1045 the commissioner would formulate the mutualization plan for the purpose of carrying out the rehabilitation of
the insurer whose business was seized under the provisions of
section 1011. The commissioner's plan would then be submitted to the court for its order directin£ the Bubmission of
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the mutualization plan to the shareholders and policyholders
of the seized insurer for their vote of approval, or disapproval
as the case might be (§ 1046, subds. (e) and (f». Old company, not having been dissolved, still exists; new company
was organized as the corporate agent of the commissioner to
rehabilitate the business of old company with the assets of
old company. New company cannot, as it appears, be con·
sidered as a completely independent and solvent organization
under the facts here prevailing. As I have pointed out, the
commissioner holds the entire beneficial interest in all the
capital stock of new company for the benefit of stockholders,
policyholders and creditors of old company; the legal title
to the stock of new company is held by voting trustees who
vote it as directed by the commissioner. As I have also
pointed out, the board of directors of new company are under
the close supervision, control and direction of the commis.
sioner and must, in reality, take orders from him as to every
major, and some minor, business details. It cannot be said
that this close supervision, control and direction exist in the
usual "solvent" corporation.
CORPORATE ENTITY OF NEW COMPANY

Respondents argue that the corporate entity of new company cannot be disregarded so as to make the proposed
mutualization a mutualization of old company. In support
of this contention, In re Bond & Mortg. Guar. Oorp., 157 Misc.
240 [283 N.Y.S. 623, 652], and Garrison v. Pacific "b'l1tt. L. Ins.
00., 83 Cal.App.2d 1, 9-10 [187 P.2d 893], are cited. In
neither case was mutualization involved. In the Bond &
Mortgage Guarantee case, the superintendent of insurance had
organized Bond & Mortgage Guarantee Oorporation "as a
domestic insurance corporation, with a capital of $1,000,000,
a surplus of $2,000,000, and a reserve for contingencies of
$200,000, all of which was paid out of the assets of the guarantee company in exchange for the entire capital stock of the
new corporation, 10,000 shares of the par value of $100 each;
a certificate for said number of shares was issued in the name
of the guarantee company and is held by the superintendent
of insurance as an asset, for the benefit of the creditors (including the policyholders), of the guarantee company." (Emphasis added.) The guarantee corporation here involved took
on the duty of insuring mortgages, "but on a restricted basis
under a limited policy of gnaranty." (Pp. 641, 650.) This
case involved a proc('('niiH! whereby the Peoplf', and certain
individuals interested, applied for an order enjoining tho
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State Mortgage Commission from demanding and receiving
or assuming control of certain mortgages being serviced by
the guarantee corporation pursuant to court order. 'fhe injunction was granted. The contention was that the guarantee
corporation, in servicing mortgages, was acting without adequate corporate powers. The court held that the corporation
was acting within its corporate authority and, in answer to the
contention that the guarantee corporation was a state agency
inseparable from the superintendent of insurance (so as to
permit another state agency, the Mortgage Commission, which
came into being after the proceedings set forth had been
had) to take it over, the court said: "Said corporation is
like any other corporation; a distinct entity. All of its stock
is owned by guarantee company, and the certificate therefor
is held in the custody of the superintendent; this he holds as
he does any other assets of the company in rehabilitation, as a
receiver designated by statute for the benefit of the creditors
and stocl{holders of said company; not as an owner, representing the state. It is a stock corporation, having been created,
for one thing, with a view to its poss'tole sale for the benefit
of the creditors, as its exhaustive by-laws make apparent.
During such time as the stock control remains as it is, the
operation of the corporation is to be under the supervision of
the superintendent as rehabilitator." (Emphasis added.)
The court continued and said that the primary management
of the corporation was with the board of directors, although it
was subject to the supervision of the superintendent "in
his capacity as supervisor of insurance companies" (pp. 651,
652). The situation presented in the New York case and
that presented in the case at bar are factually similar up to
a point. I have heretofore quoted extensively from Oaminetti
v. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. 00., 22 Ca1.2d 344, at page 356 [139
P.2d 908], wherein we set forth the extensive and minute
supervision exercised by the commissioner over new company. This supervision exceeded by far anything required
of him as "supervisor of insurance companies." We also
said in Oarpenter v. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. 00., 10 Ca1.2d 307,
324, 325 [74 P.2d 761], that new company was organized
"as a corporate agent to assist him [commissioner] in carrying on the business of tlIe old company." (See also Oaminetti
v. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. 00., 22 Ca1.2d 77, 80 [136 P.2d 719].)
In Garrison v. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. 00., 83 Cal.App.2d 1
[187 P.2d 893], the court said, "The question for decision
iii whether an insurance company which was organized to
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conserve an insolvent insurance company and to rehabilitate
its business is obligated to pay interest on claims allowed by
the conservator against such insolvent, based upon the breach
by the latter of certain policies, in the absence from the
~ehabilitation agreement of a specific promise to pay such
interest, the agreement having provided for the payment to
the liquidator for the benefit of such claimants an amount
equal to the sum of all 'allowed claims' against the insolvent
company." New company, by the terms of the rehabilitation
agreement had agreed (Paragraph 17) "to pay to the liquidator for payment to claimants an amount equal to the
sum of all claims against old company filed with the liquidator
and finally allowed." The court answered the question put
with this statement: "It is customary practice in liquidation
proceedings to marshal the assets of the debtor, fix the amount
of its liabilities and disburse the assets among the creditors
pro rata. Such a process would not be possible, if during the
season of liquidation, the claims should be varied by the additions of varying amounts of interest." (P. 9.) Respondents
rely upon the following paragraph from the opinion of the
District Court in the Garrison case: "Appellants contend
that new company is a reincarnation of old company and,
therefore, has impliedly promised to pay all of the latter's
indebtedness. In this they ignore provisions of the Insurance Code, article 14 of chapter 1, part 2, division 1, which
article deals with insolvency and liquidation proceedings.
Section 1043 of such article provides that in any proceeding
under the article, tke commissioner may mutualize or reinsure
tke business of any person affected by proceedings thereunder
and may enter into rehabilitation agreements. New company
was organized by tke sovereign power for tke purpose of rehabilitating tke b'usiness of one of its own c,.eatures wkose very
existence inkered in tke blood and sweat of tk~ people. It
was to go forward under the guidance of the state. Its identity
is utterly distinct from that of old company, notwithstanding
the latter's equitable ownership of new company's stock. It
cannot be fairly said that it is a continuance of old company.
It did not take over the latter's assets or assume its burdens
at the behest of old company. Such transfer and assumption
were rendered indispensable to the public weal and were
required by law to conserve the common good in general and
the army of policyholders of old company in particular. New
company was not organized by old company to do service in
a prescribed manner for the latter but was created bl the state
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to perform a public service. It must be and act in its own
right upon the arena of trade and commerce and of human
existence, free from the fetters 0:£ a collapsed institution which
in the kaleidoscope of a changing world will soon be only
a memory." (Pp. 9, 10.) New company was organized by
the state to rehabilitate the business of old company; as the
"corporate agent" of the insurance commissioner for that
purpose. The language just quoted is, in part, illogical under
the facts presented in this long line of litigation, including
the Garrison case. It appears to me that the statement that
"its [new company] identity is 'Utterly distinct" is inconsistent with the latter part of the same sentence that this was
so "notwithstanding the latter's [old company] equitable
ownership of new company's stock" and with one of the
preceding sentences wherein it is said that "New companJ
was organized by the sovereign power for the purpose of
rehabilitating the business of" old company, and the fact
that new company" was to go forward under the guidance of
the state." The duties and obligations imposed upon the
commissioner in this case amount to far more than his usual
supervision of the usual solvent insurance company. There
can be no doubt that new company is a separate corporate
agency and that it was not organized by old company, but it
does not logically follow that it is "utterly distinct" from
old company. In my opinion, new company would have no
e:T~::;tence but for the insolvency proceedings against old company. It also conclusively appears that the quoted statement
from the Garrison case is dictum since it had nothing to do
with the question involved there.
Respondents also argue that because this court said in
Carpenter v. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. Co., 10 Cal.2d 307, 334
[74 P.2d 761], that new company was, as a reinsurer, "substituted as an insurer in the place and stead of the original
insurer" that the corporate identity of new company cannot
be disregarded; that because this court said in the Carpenter
case (p. 335) that "Every policyholder who consents to the
Plan clearly enters into a novation with the New Company"
that the two companies cannot be considered as "essentially
one and the same." New company will in time replace old
company but so long as old company exists in any form, it is
clear that new company is still only the c01'porate age1it of
the commissioner for the purpose of rehabilitating the business of old company and that the mutualization plan must
be worked out in accordance with the procedure provided for
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in that part of the Insurance Code relating to involuntary
mutualization of insolvent companies. The stock of new company, held now by voting trustees, with beneficial ownership
in the commissioner is still held by him for the benefit of
~he policyholders and creditors of old company. This fact
cannot be disregarded; nor can the rights of the policyholders
and creditors of old company be disregarded. In holding
that new company is "utterly distinct" from old company
for all purposes, a majority of this court chooses to forget
all the facts concerning this litigation and pretends that new
company was organized as any other insurance company with
its own assets and liabilities, that the insurance commissioner
had only the normal, nominal, supervision over its affairs. and
that no insolvency proceedings had ever been involved. In
the light of the record before us, such a holding cannot
stand the test of honest scrutiny.
RES JUDICATA
Respondents argue that it has been decided by the superior
court that the commissioner had authority to include in a
rehabilitation agreement an option to mutualize the new company by voluntary proceedings and to agree to dispose of the
stock of new company at the price, and on the terms, fixed
by the price determination committee; and that this court
has decided that the superior court had jurisdiction to so
decide and that the superior court did not abuse its discretion
in approving the rehabilitation agreement.
In the commissioner's answering brief (p. 61) is found
this statement: "It is true that no attack seems to have been
made on the mutualization provisions [of the rehabilitation
agreement1 in any of the appellate proceedings, but the courts
have taken notice of them in determining various appeals."
Neither this court, nor an appellate court, has been concerned
in any of this litigation with the mutualization provisions of
the rehabilitation agreement as will hereinafter appear.
In Oarpenter v. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. 00., 10 Ca1.2d 307,
322 [74 P.2d 7611, we said that the plan of rehabilitation
provided for "Ultimate mutualization, in the event the policyholders so elect. " We were there concerned in the main with
the organization of new company as the corporate agent of
the commissioner to rehabilitate the business of old company.
In Oarpenter v. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. 00., 13 Ca1.2d 306 [89
P.2d 637], we were concerned with the validity of the" Order
for Liquidation" and the mutualization provisions of the plan
wen not considered. In Carpenter v. Pacific Mut. L. 1M. Co.,

)
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14 Ca1.2d 704 [96 P.2d 796], we were concerned with an
order of the trial court correcting its minutes, nunc pro tunc.
In Caminetti v. Pacific Mut. E~ Ins. Co., 22 Ca1.2d 77 [136
P.2d 779], we were concerned with the claims of dissenting
policyholders and, once again, the mutualization provisions
were not considered. In Camineiti v. Pacific lIlut. L. Ins. Co.,
22 Cal.2d 344, 353 [139 P.2d 908], we were concerned with
the propriety of creating a voting trust with the stock of
new company under the provisions of section 1037, subdivision
(e), of the Insurance Code. We said there that "To adopt
the contention that section 1037 (e) was not intended to I
apply to stock of an insurance company organized as a medi1lm
througJt which rehabilitation of the business of a delinquent
insurer was to be accomplished would require us to disregard
the clear language of the statute. Section 1037 (e) specifically
refers to stock issued to the commissioner 'as conservator or
as liquidator in connection with a rehabilitation or reinsurance agreement.'" (Emphasis added.) We also said there
(p. 355) that the rehabilitation agreement (Paragraph 20)
related to the" ultimate status and ownership of the new company." We then pointed out that subdivision (a) (Paragraph
20) authorizes the commissioner to dispose of the stocl~ in accordance with "any plan of mutualization thereafter adopted
by the policyholders of the new company, and such a disposition may include a transfer to voting trustees if the plan of
mutualization so provides. " We held that the voting trust
agreement was not a disposal of the stock within the meaning
or purpose of Paragraph 20 of the rehabilitation agreement
and we said (p. 358) that "It is true that the words 'dispose
of' are used in subdivision (a) of paragraph 20 in connection with an authorization to the commissioner to transfer
the stock of the new company to voting trustees in accordance with a plan of mutualization. But it is clear that uncle,.
that subdivision the transfer there provided for would require
a complete alienation of the stock in order to carry out the plan
of mutualization contemplated therein." (Emphasis added.)
Again, the validity of the mutualization procedure was not
passed upon; the only holding being that the rehabilitation
agreement did not preclude the creation of the voting trust.
In Caminetti v. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. Co., 22 Ca1.2d 386. [139.
P.2d 930], we were concerned with disqualification of a judge
and a party's waiver thereof. Mutualization was not considered. In Caminetti v. Pacific 1I1ut. L. Ins. Co., 23 Ca1.2d 94
[142 P.2d 741], we were concerned with the correctness of the
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measure of damages adopted by the commissioner to be a1·
lowed disability policyholders. In Garn'son v. Pacific Mut. L.
Ins. Co., 83 Cal.App.2d 1 [187 P.2d 893], the court was con·
cerned with the q llcstion of iutcrest on claims allowed by the
eommissioner. In Sanborn v. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. Co., 42 Cal.
App.2d 99 [108 P.2d 458], the court pointed out that the fol·
lowing questions were involved: What was the effective date
of the agreement between new company and the insurance
commissioner as conservator of old company? Did appellant '8
pI'esent disability commence prior to such date and was notice
of claim filed in accordance with the agreement'
It is contended by respondents, however, that a judgment
upholding the validity of a contract establishes its validity,
not only against the attacks actually made, but against those
that could have been made, even though no question of in·
valillity was raised in the original proceeding and even though
the judgment does not expressly pass on the contract.
Appellants argue that the procedure for mutualization pro·
vided for by statute cannot be altered by contract and that
any attempt to do so is against public poiicy, illegal and void.
It is true, of course, that the plan of mutualization, as pro·
posed by the price determination committee, has never been
before the courts until the present proceeding. 'fhe trial
court, in its order of December 4, 1!)36, stated (13) "That
said Rehabilitation and Reinsurance Agreement, and each and
all of the terms and conditions thereof, and the plan therein
embodied are, and each of them is, hereby approved; •.. "
(Clk. Tr., p. 169.) This was an approval only of the agree·
ment and, while grossly wrong, does not now preclude this
court from correcting the error since the plan of mutualization
was not passed upon nor could it have been since it was to be
promulgated 10 years in the future.
We said in the Caminetti case (22 Ca1.2d 344, 363) "This
proceeding is wholly statutory. The duties imposed upon the
commissioner, and the supervision over him vested in the
courts, result from the statute." Appellants, citing Fortenbury v. Superior Court, 16 Ca1.2d 405, 407-408 [106 P.2d 411],
contend that if the order of the trial court (December 4, 1!)36)
is considered as having approved a plan of mutualization contrary to the statutory provisions therefor, it is void for want
of jurisdiction of the subjed matter. The respondents' po·
sition is that this court having previously determined the
trial court's j urisdictiol1. the mu Ltcr is res judicata. In the
Fortenbury casel' we said "1'he term jurisdiction originally
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included only the right to hear and determine concerning the
subject matter in a particular case. But the modern tendency
has been to broaden the meaning, particularly where the right
to review a decision by certiorari, or other prerogative writ
is the question for decision. A court may have jurisdiction of
the cause of action and of the parties, but it may lack the
authority or power to act in the case except in a particular
way. Under such circumstances, it is now generally held that
the court had no jurisdiction. As pointed out in the case of
Spreckels S. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 186 Cal. 256, 260
[199 P. 8], 'the word is frequently used as meaning authority
to do the particular thing done, or, putting it conversely, a
want of jurisdiction frequently means a want of authority
to exercise in a particular manner a power which the board
or tribunal has, the doing in excess of the authority possessed.' " (Emphasis added.) We also said in First Industrial
Loan Co. v. Daugherty, 26 Ca1.2d 545, 556 l159 P.2d. 921],
that "It is elementary that power given to the Commissioner
of Corporations (by section 10 of the act) 'to establish such
rules and regulations as may be reasonable or necessary to
carry out the purposes and provisions of this act' does not
include power to alter the statute or enlarge or impair its
scope." (Emphasis added.)
It seems apparent that if the involuntary mutualization
provisions for insolvent insurance companies are applicable
the commissioner was acting without statutory authority in
approving a plan of mutualization based upon the statutory
provisions relating to voluntary mutualization of solvent companies and that his approval thereof was void, as was his
agreement to approve such a plan. The rule is settled that a
contract in violation of an express statutory provision is void
and that it· is not necessary that the statute expressly so declare (City of Oakland v. California Const. Co., 15 Ca1.2d 573,
576 [104 P.2d 30]). A contract made in any manner except
that expressly provided in the applicable statute is ipso facto
void (Dale v. Palmer, 106 Cal.App.2d 663, 667 [235 P.2d
650]). If upon review of all the legislation on the subject
the contract appears to contravene the design and policy of
the laws, the courts will not enforce it (Kreamer v. Earl, 91
Cal. 112 [27 P. 735] ; Loew's Inc. v. Cole, 185 F.2d 641): See
lIill v. Bank of San Pedro, 41 Cal.App.2d 595, 607 [107 P.2d
399] ; County of San Diego v. California Water etc. Co., 30
Ca1.2d 817 [186 P.2d 124, 175 A.L.R. 747]; Film Producers,
Inc. v. Jordo/ll, 171 Cal. 664 [154 P. 605].
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The parties are in disagreement as to whether or not the
mutualization provisions were litigated at the time the order
of Deccmber 4, 1936, was made. The insurance commissioner
says that "Presumably these provisions did not go entirely
,unchallenged in the proceedings leading up to the Order of
Rehabilitation." (Emphasis added.) (Insurance commissioner's answering brief, p. 61.) New company asserts that the
"validity" of the rehabilitation agreement was put in issue
and decided by the order of December 4, 1936, and that the
same has been approved by this court. From all that appears,
it is obvious that the precise question here involved has never
been passed upon. It most certainly has not been passed upon
by an appellate court, or by this court. Respondent, new company, points to the following quotations from the pleadings
in the original proceeding as showing that the mutualization
provisions of paragraph 20 (a) were litigated. "Answer of
Certain Interveners to Petition for Approval of Second Proposed Rehabilitation and Reinsurance Agreement, Folios 27572759 of Transcript on Appeal. L.A. 16182:
"That said plan, if executed, would be entirely void and of
no effect, and would not be binding upon the parties thereto,
and that the execution of the same is beyond the authority
of the said Samuel L. Carpenter, Jr., as Insurance Commissioner of the State of California and as Conservator of The
Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company of California [old
company], and that the execution of said agreement and the
transfer of the assets by the said Insurance Commissioner is
wholly unauthorized by the Insurance Code of the state of
California and is entirely beyond the power of the said Samuel
L. Carpenter, Jr., as Insurance Commissioner and as Conservator as aforesaid, and the said agreement will be void
when executed and beyond the power of the Insurance Commissioner under the statute in such cases made and provided
and that the said agreement is of no binding effect whatever
on any of the parties thereto and that any acts done pursuant
thereto are wllOlly null and void."
U Amended Complaint in
Intervention of Certain Intervenors, Folio 3882 of Transcript on Appeal, L.A. 16182:
"That the approval of said agreement is beyond the authority and jurisdiction of this court and, if given, would
be void and of no force and effect, for the reason that authority
therefor is not given in, and, in fact, is forbidden by, the
terms and provisions of said InSllrance Code of California,
and, in particular, of artidcs is [sic] and 14 of chapter 1 of
part 2 of division 1 thereof."

)
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It appears to me that what was undoubtedly meant by
these pleadings was that the organization of new company
was said to be beyond the commissioner's power since that
was the major issue in Carpenter v. PaC1:fic M1lt. L. Ins. Co.,
10 Ca1.2d 307 [74 P.2d 761].
The next question that arises is whether or not the provisions for mutualization could have been litigated in that
proceeding inasmuch as mutualization was not to take place
until between 1946 and 1948, or "so long as the Conservator
or a Liquidator of the Old Company may continue to hold any
or all of said stock . . . . " (Paragraph 20 (a), rehabilitation
agreement.) The proposed voluntary mutualization plan was
also to be in accordance "with the laws of the State of California in effect at the time of said request. . . ." The plan
was also not to be proposed unless the price determination
committeee "shall determine whether in their opinion the
proposed voluntary mutualization of the New Company . . .
can then be practicably accomplished . . . . " In Silva v.
City &- County of San Francisco, 87 Cal.App.2d 784 [198
P.2d 78], a county board of supervisors passed a resolution
that certain land of plaintiff's should be acquired when necessary. Plaintiff sued for a declaration as to the value of his
property. The court, in refusing to place plaintiff's valllation
on the property, declared: "The court may take judicial
knowledge that real estate values do not remain constant.
The value fixed during the present period may be disproportionate to what should be paid when the recreation department of the city decides to use the property as part of a
'playground.' Plaintiff seeks a final determination that the
property is worth $10,000 and that if and when defendant
chooses to take the property this will be the amount it must
pay." (Emphasis that of the court.) It was also said that
" . . . the present complaint alleges in substance that the
value of the property may be determined thro1.lgh condemnation proceedings when defendant deems it 'necessary.' The
only declaratory judgment that could be rendered under the
allegations of the complaint would be of an advisory naturenamely, that when defendant deems it necessary to institute
condemnation proceedings the price be fixed at the then
market value." (Pp. 788-789.)
•
In Young v. Young, 100 Cal.App.2d 85, 87 [223 P.2d 25],
it was held that an action to establish a foreign decree of
divorce in California, and for ratification by the California
court of a property settlement included in the foreign de-
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cree, did not present a justiciable controversy in the absence
of a showing that defendant had refused or failed to comply
with the foreign decree or the terms of the property settlement
agreement. It was held that "The rule is accurately stated in
• 1 California Jurisprudence (1921) at page 335, section 25,
as follows: 'To invoke the jurisdiction of a court of justice, it
is primarily essential that there be involved a genuine and
existing controversy, calling for present adjudication as involving present rights.' (See also Neill v. Five O. Refining
00., 79 Cal.App.2d 191 [179 P.2d 818]), wherein Mr. Justice
Drapeau thus pointedly states the rule at page 193, 'An action
not founded upon an actual controversy, or prosecuted "for
the gratification of the curiosity of the litigants" is collusive
and will not be entertained. [Citing cases.] , "
In Merkley v. Merkley, 12 Ca1.2d 543, 547 [86 P.2d 89], the
court stated that" The facts in the record present an academic
question only. The courts will not exercise the discretionary
power to declare rights which do not give rise to a present
controversy. ' ,
In Oounty of San Diego v. Oalifot'nia Water etc. 00., 30 Cal.
2d 817,823,826 (186 P.2d 124, 175 A.L.R. 747], a case involving an agreement by a county to relocate a county highway,
we enunciated the following rule: That if the Legislature had
provided a method by which a county or city might abandon
or vacate roads, that method was exclusive. We said: "It
is clear, however, that neither the doctrine of estoppel nor
any other equitable principle may be invoked against a governmental body where it would operate to defeat the effective
operation of a policy adopted to protect the public. (See
Millet v. McKinnon, 20 Ca1.2d 83 [124 P.2d 34, 140 A.L.R.
570], and cases cited therein; Pan American Petro &- Transp.
Co. v. Un,ited States, 273 U.S. 456, 505-506 [47 S.Ct. 416, 71
L.Ed. 734] ; American S1trety 00. of N. Y. v. United States
(C.C.A. 10th), 112 F.2d 903, 906.) In the American Surety
Company case the court stated that the government could not
be estopped so as to 'frustrate the purpose of its laws or thwart
its public policy.' (112 F.2d, at p. 906.) In 3 McQuillin,
Municipal Corporations l2d ed., 19431. section 1266, it is said
that various statutory procedures or steps exist to protect citizens and taxpayers from iU-considered contracts or those showing favoritism and that if recovery is allowed for property or
services on the ground of estoppel or implied contract, C then
it follows as the night the day that the statute or charter
provision can always be evaded and set at naught. The
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author adds that the rule denying indirect enforcement of
such void contracts harmonizes with our governmental system,
appears to be supported by reason, and is not unjust, because
the other party is charged with notice of the law."
At any rate, the plan of mutualization, as distinguished
from the provisions for mutualization as found in the rehabilitation agreement, has never until this case, been passed
upon. That plan, while following the outline contained in
Paragraph 20(a) made some 10 years prior to'the promulgation of the one here under consideration, is an entirely different matter and may properly be held void as not in
accordance with the statutory scheme for involuntary mutualization of insolvent insurance companies seized by the commissioner under the provisions of sections 1010 and 1011 of
the Insurance Code. The rule enunciated in County of San
Diego v. California Water etc. Co., supra, hereinabove set
forth would be applicable if the plan of mutualization is held
void as against public policy and as being in excess of the
commissioner's jurisdiction.
It should be noted that Paragraph 20(f) contains a provision to the effect that if all, or any part, of the paragraph
should be contrary to law, or illegal, or void, the vulnerable
provision should be deemed separable and the balance of the
agreement should stand. If, as I believe, the validity of
Paragraph 20(a) has never been before determined, the provision just noted w0uld prevent anything that has been heretofore determined by either this court, or any appellate court,
from conflicting with the determination made here.
Novo
If the procedure for involuntary mutualization had been
followed, as it should have been, this question would never
have arisen. Section 1048 of the Insurance Code provides
that after the formulation of the mutualization plan. it
"shall" be submitted by the commissioner to the court for
its approval. The clear import of the procedure outlined
for insolvent organizations is that those possessed of property
rights in them must be accorded court protection at every
stage. For example, the court appoints the appraisers
(§ 1051). Such court approval, required by section 1048, accords the interested parties the equivalent of a trial de novo.
According to the majority opinion, the" alternative" reason
given for affirmance is reliaiH~e upon the doctrine of res
judicata. That this reason is patently false is shown by Mr.
TRIAL DE
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Justice 'l'raynor when he points out that the court "could
obviously not approve [the] plan at the time it entered its
order approving the rehabilitation agreement. Moreover, it
did not expressly approve in advance the carrying out of
allY mutualization plan that might be presented by the price
determination committee." He shows that there is reserved to
the court, by the agreement, continuing jurisdiction to approve or disapprove plans to be developed in the future for
mutualization or other disposal of the stock in the hands of
the commissioner. He points out that to so interpret the order
subserves the primary purpose of section 1037, subdivision
( d), of the Insurance Code by securing to all interested
parties "their right to court scrutiny." Appellants have not
been accorded "court scrutiny" in its true sense.
Appellants correctly contend that the order of the commissioner approving the plan of mutualization was subject to
full judicial review by the superior court. It is argued that
the commissioner, in making his order, acted in a judicial
capacity rather than in an administrative or legislative capacity as contended by respondents. Appellants contend that in
reviewing a decision or order of a statewide administrative
agency or of a state officer, the superior court must reweigh
the evidence and determine for itself according to its independent judgment whether or not the decision is supported
by the weight or preponderance of the evidence in every case
where state judicial functions are involved. They rely upon
Thomas v. Oalifornia Emp. Stab. Oom., 39 CaI.2d 501, 504
[247 P.2d 561] ; Moran v. Board of ~fedtical Examiners, 32
Ca1.2d 301, 308 [196 P.2d 20] ; Laisne v. Oalifornia State Board
of Optometry, 19 Ca1.2d 831, 834-835 [123 P.2d 457] ; and
Drummey v. State Board of Funeral Directors &- Embalmers,
13 Ca1.2d 75 [87 P.2d 848]. Respondents, on the other hand,
argue that the commissioner's order was an exercise of executive power and was not the exercise of such full judicial
power as to entitle appellants to have the trial court exercise
its independent judgment with respect to the weight of the
evidence. Respondents rely upon the cases of Bank of Italy
v. Johnson, 200 Cal. 1 [251 P. 7841; Doble Steam Motors
Oorp. v. Daugherty, 195 Cal. 158 f232 P. 140] ; McDonough
v. Goodcell, 13 Ca1.2d 741 r91 P.2d 1035, 123 A.L.R. 1205],
and Southern Oalir Jockey Cl'ub, Inc. v. Oalifornia etc. Raoing
Board, 36 Ca1.2cl 167 [223 P.2d 1].
The duties of the COlIHllissioner, as set fortIl in section
12921 have been held to be "that of a minister of the court
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in possession of the property, to the end of conserving the
rights of everybody having any interest" (H. D. Roosen Co. v.
Pacific Radio Pub. Co., 123 Cal.App. 525 [11 P.2rl 873])
and- discretionary (Garris v. Carpenter, 33 Cal.App.2d 64g,
657 [92 P.2d 688]). It was held in Caminetti v. Guaranty
Union Uife Ins. Co., 22 Ca1.2d 759, 764 [141 P.2d 423], that
the commissioner '8 ". • . office is not to perform functions
in aid of the court's jurisdiction to decide a controversy between litigants, but he acts as a statutory officer, subject however to judicial supervision to prevent an arbitrary exercise
of power or neglect of duty." The court in the Caminetti
case, however, was referring to the commissioner as a receiver of the assets of insurance companies and stated that
he did not derive his power from the court, bllt from the
statute.
The distinction in the two lines of cases relied upon by
appellants and respondents is that in those relied upon by
appel1ants an existing vested property right was extinguished,
or taken away, by the administrative order. For example,
in the Drummey case (13 Ca1.2d 75) Drummey and Wilson
had been duly licensed embalmers and the State Board of
Funeral Directors and Embalmers ordered their licenses suspended. This court lleld that it was dealing with a statute
which conferred certain fact-finding powers on a board exercising statewide jurisdiction and that there was no "indication that the legislature intended the facts so found to be
binding on the courts"; that no method of review was provided in the statute. We held that we could see no escape
from the conclusion that in such a proceeding the court to
which the application for mandate is made must weigh the
evidence, and exercise its independent judgment on the facts
as well as the law, if the eomplaining party is to be accorded
his constitutional rights und~r the state and federal Constitutions. "The state constitutional provision discussed, supra,
prohibits the conferring of judicial power on such administrative boards" (p. 84).
In Laisne v. California State Board of Optometry, supra,
the California State Board of Optometry had revoked Laisne's
certificate of registration to practice optometry in this state.
We held there that "On the authority of the Drummey case
the only type of review that would afford appellant his full
constitutional rights would be a complete trial de novo as
outlined in the decision in that case." (P. 843.)
In Moran v. Board of Medical Examiners, supra, the State
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Board of Medical Examiners revoked the license of Dr. Moran
to practice medicine in this state. We held "That the trial
court in this case was 'authorized by law to exercise its independent judgment on the evidence' is well established.
. (See Dare v. Board of Medical Examiners (1943), 21 Ca1.2d
790, 795 [136 P.2d 304] ; Sipper v. Urban (1943), 22 Ca1.2d
138, 141 [137 P.2d 425] ; Hohreiter v. Garrison (1947), 81
Cal.App.2d 384, 402 [184 P.2d 323].) As stated in the last
cited case, at page 402, 'Thus, the ultimate power of decision
rests with the trial court.'" (P. 308.)
In Thomas v. Oalifornia Emp. Stab. Oom., 39 Ca1.2d 501
[247 P.2d 561], it was held that unemployment benefits provided for by the Unemployment Insurance Act were such
property rights as to fall within the rule that persons deprived
of property rights by a statutory administrative agency were
entitled to a limite<l trial de novo in the superior court.
Respondents' position (which has been adopted in toto by
the majority opinion) is that the "Order" of the commissioner was merely a "permit" which allowed mutualization
if the policyholders so voted (§ 11526, subd. (d)) and that
the order did not deprive anyone of vested property rights.
We have heretofore held (Thomas v. Oalifornia Emp. Stab.
Oom., 39 Ca1.2d 501, 504 [247 P.2d 561] ; Laisne v. Oalifornia
State Board of Optometr'lj, 19 Cal.2d 831 [123 P.2d 457];
Moran v. Board of Medical Examiners, 32 Cal.2d 301, 308
[196 P.2d 20] ; Drummey v. State Board of Funeral Directors
&- Embalmers, 13 Ca1.2d 75 [87 P.2d 848]) that where an
existing property right is extinguished by the questioned ad- .
ministrative order the one so deprived is entitled to a trial
de novo in the superior court. Appellants here are the beneficial owners of the stock of the new company which is held
by the voting trustees for their benefit. Under the proposed
mutualization plan, this stock will be nonexisteut and they
will be forced to accept a price therefor, as well as terms,
over whieh they have exercised no control. Mr. Justice Traynor has pointed out that if the proper procedure had been
followed, the rights of these people would have been protected by a court of law, rath('r than subjected to the action
of one man acting in three irreconcilable positions. The
assets of old company were transferred to new company
in exchange for all the stock of new company which, in the
beginning, was held by the commissioner, as conservator for
the benefit of the creditors, policyholders, and stocl\:holders of
old company (Oaminetti v. Pac·ific Mut. L. Ins. 00.,22 Cal.2d
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344, 351 [139 P.2d 908]). Later, the stock of new company
was transferred to voting trustees who held legal title thereto,
" . . . with the power to exercise all the rights of ownership.
The commissioner, however, retains the entire beneficial interest for the benefit of creditors of the old company and
others interested." (22 Cal.2d, at page 357.) As stated by
the insurance commissioner in his opinion and decision (page
7 of the exhibit) : "Greatly epitomized, the plan [of mutualization] determined that both the Participating and Non-Participating Life Departments of the company should be mutualized by the purchase and cancellation of all of the outstanding shares of capital stock of the New Company, thus
converting the New Company into a non-stock insurer conducted for the benefit of its members who shall be the policy.
holders of the participating and non-participating life
classes. " Inasmuch as purchase and cancellation of the stock
of new company will be accomplished by the proposed mutualization, it appears that appellants have been deprived, by
the order, of their vested beneficial ownership of that stock
so as to entitle them to a trial de novo within the rule of the
cited cases.
The majority opinion states: "The approval of the mutualization plan by the commissioner did not involve any
deprivation of property rights or vested rights; it was in
essence a permit or license authorizing the new company to
purchase its own stock." This would be true if new company
members owned their own stock (and therein lies the fallacy
in calling new company a solvent corporation with all that
term connotes). But the matter is not quite so simple. All
the beneficial ownership, which is the real ownership is held
by the policyholders and stockholders of old company; all
the legal title is held by the voting trustees (appointed by
the commissioner) for the benefit of old company policyholders and stockholders. In other words, new company holds
neither legal nor beneficial ownership of its stock, but through
the medium of the mutualization plan is given the right to
deprive the beneficial owners of their property in clear violation of the law as heretofore propounded by this court.
We held in the Drummey case that we could see no escape
from the conclusion that the court must weigh the evidence
and exercise its independent judgment on the facts as well
as the law, if the complaining party was to be accorded his
constitutional rights under the state and federal Constitutions. "The state constitutional provision discussed, snlpra,

)
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prohibits the conferring of judicial power on such administrative boards."
In St. Joseph Stock Yards 00. v. United Btates, 298 U.S.
38,52 [56 S.Ct. 720, 80 L.Ed. 1033], the court stated: "LegislAtive agencies, with varying qualifications, work in a field
peculiarly exposed to political demands. Some may be expert
and impartial, others subservient. It is not difficult for
them to observe the requirements of law in giving a hearing
and receiving evidence. But to say that their findings of
fact may be made conclusive where constitutitmal rights of
liberty and property are involved, although the evidence
clearly establishes that the findings are wrong and constitutional rights have been invaded, is to place those rights at
the mercy of administrative ()fficials and seriously to impair
the security inherent in our judicial safeguards. That prospect, with our multiplication of administrative agencies, is
not one to be lightly regarded. It is said that we can retain
judicial authority to examine the weight of evidence when
the question concerns the right of personal liberty. But if
this be so, it is not because we are privileged to perform our
judicial duty in that case and for reasons of convenience to
disregard it in others. The principle applies whe'l& rights
either of persons or of property are protected by constitutional restrictions. Under our system there is no warrant for
the view that tha judicial power of a competent court can
be circumscribed by any legislative arrangement designed to
give effect to administrative action going beyond the limits
of constitutional authority." (Emphasis added.) This case
and t.his statement were relied upon by us in the Drummey
case (supra, 13 Ca1.2d 75, 85) and no information has been
presented to me to show that the rule there set forth has
been in any way changed. No clearer case than this could
possibly be found to illustrate the evils to be avoided. Old
company stockholders and policyholders have been, and are,
at the" mercy" of administrative officials; those officials may,
during the last 10 years, have been either "expert and impartial" or "subservient."
I have heretofore set forth at length the self-evident fact
that appellants are possessed of vested property rights of
which they are being deprived. In Ohio Valley Water 00. v.
Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287, 289 r40 S.Ct. 527, 64 L.Ed.
908], it was held: "The order here involved prescribed a
complete schedule of maximnm future rates and was legislative in character. Pre-ntis v. Atlantic Ooast Line R. 00., 211

j
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210 [29 8.Ct. 67, 53 L.Ed. 150]; Lake Erie & W. R.
00. v. State Public UtiUties 0O'J'n., 249 U.S. 422, 424 [39 S.Ct.
345, 63 L.Ed. 684]. In all such cases, if the owner claims Clmf£sootilm of his property wiU result, the state must provide a
fair opportunity for submitting that issue to a judicial tribunal for determination upon its oum independent judgment
as to both law and facts: otherwise the order is void because
in conflict with the due process clause, fourteenth amendment.
Missouri Pac. By. 00. v. Tucker, 230 U.S. 340, 347 [33 S.Ct.
961, 57 L.Ed. 1507]; Wadley Southern Ry. 00. v. Georgia,
235 U.S. 651, 660, 661 [35 S.Ct. 214, 59 L.Ed. 405] ; Missouri
v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. 00., 241 U.S. 533, 538 [36 S.Ct. 715,
60 L.Ed. 1148] ; Oklaho'ma Operating 00. v. Love, 252 U.S.
331 [40 8.Ct. 338, 64 L.Ed. 596]." (Emphasis added.)
Appellants here complain bitterly because the mutualization plan provides that the price to be paid for new company's stock (of which they are the beneficial owners) is
$3,000,000 while that same amount was originally taken out
of old company's funds to purchase new company '8 stock and,
in addition, all the other assets of old company (over $200,000,000 in assets plus such intangibles as going agency organization and concern, good will, etc., "worth several millions of dollars" [Oarpenter v. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. 00., 10
Ca1.2d 307, 325 (74 P.2d 761)]) were turned over to new company I It surely must be crystal clear to everyone who can
think that such an outrageous confiscation of property without due process of law has never before taken place in this
state.
EVIDENCE

In the trial court the evidence consisted of all of the record
of the proceedings before the insurance commissioner, consisting of the reporter's daily transcript, the exhibits and
the commissioner's decision. Appellants contend that they
were prohibited from introducing evidence, or offering to
do so, because of the rulings of the trial court; that no issues
of fact were litigated; that the court ruled that it was not
empowered to exercise its independent judgment on the evidence taken before the commissioner. Respondents state that
appellants were given leave to serve and file a motion and
affidavits relative to the introduction of additional evidence
and failed to do so. The memorandum opinion and order
(July 2, 1951, Clk. Tr., 237-239) contains this statement:
-"After a careful study of the briefs submitted and the au-
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thorities cited I have come to the conclusion that, so far as
any matter of fact is concerned, this Court is limited to determining whether or not the findings of the Commissioner
are supported by substantial evidence in the light of the whoZ6
• record, but that it is for this oourt to exercise its independent
judgment in interpreting the RehabilitatWn. A.greement and
in construing and applying section 11527 of the Insurance
Code. . . .
" I have come to the further conclusion that this Court
cannot receive any additional evidence, but that upon proper
showing may remand this matter to the CommjMioner to take
further evidence and reconsider the case in the light of such
evidence. . . ."
Appellants point to the statements made by the trial judge
on the settlement of findings that II I think it must be very
evident if 1 .1w.d 1w.d this case to decide on a new question
of fact my decision might have been the opposite" (emphasis
added; page 766, Rep. Tr.) and "It [fixing the price] is
very complex, and I think you are making it more complex.
My finding was, and the basis of my determination was that
they [the price determination committee] had a reasoned
basis in fixing the price. That is the fact. If they had acted
unreasonably then I would have had to set it aside. It was
only because I could not convince myself that it was not a
rational conclusion that they acted upon that I ever decided
the case the way I did. Because 1 could 'Mt take the facts and
arrive at the same conclusion~· 'Mt by a long shot. B'ut because
1 did 'Mt feel tkat I could substitute my opinion for theirs,
or substitute my opinion for the Oommissioner's, that is th,
reason I arrived at tke conclusion that I did. But that is the
crux of it. It is not the details that they took in. What you
are entitled to find now is entirely evidentiary." (Emphasis
added.) The inference from this is obvious-that had the involuntary procedure been followed, the court would have
withheld its approval because the plan did not protect the
interests of those owning the beneficial interests.
The just-quoted statement made by the trial court shows,
without equivocation, that had there b€:'en a trial de novo
his decision would have been contrary to that reached. His
statement shows that he was convinced tha.t the weight of the
evidence was with appellants but, believing himself limited
by the substantial evidence rule, his conclusion was in favor
of respondents. The only rational conclusion to be drawn from
the faets of thia case is that appellanta were pOliiessea of •
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vested property right and, therefore, should have been given
a trial de novo in a judicial tnoundl provided by the state
for the protection of private pro~erty rights. Because appellants were not afforded a trial de novo they have been deprived of their property without the due process of law guaranteed to them by both the state and federal Constitutions.
SUMMARY OF MAJOR POINTS

(1) It is my opinion that the provisions of the Insurance
Code relating to voluntary mutualization of solvent insurance
companies were not applicable to new company. As I have
heretofore pointed out, new company was organized because
of the insolvency of old company and cannot be considered
as a solvent company until the liabilities arising from the
non-can policies have been paid or sufficient funds accumulated to pay them. The voluntary mutualization provisions
of the code in and of themselves show that they were intended
by the Legislature to apply to not only a solvent company
but to a company not so closely supervised by the commissioner as the one here under consideration. The ordinary
solvent company is not such a hybrid as we have in new
company. In using the voluntary procedure, we have the
commissioner, acting as conservator and beneficial owner of
the stock of new company, agreeing to vote for the plan of
mutualization as proposed by the price determination committee. As conservator. and beneficial owner of the stock of
new company, he is supposed to be protecting the rights and
interests of those in the position of appellants. When, as
commissioner, he approves the proposed plan as fair and
equitable, under the voluntary mutualization procedure, he is
concerned with the fairness of the plan as it concerns those
interested in new company. If the normal solvent company
were being mutualized, the plan of mutualization would be
proposed by the company itself. approved by its board of
directors, adopted by a majority vote of its own shareholders,
and then approved by the commissioner who, presumably,
would not have seen the plan, or even heard of it, prior to
the time it was presented to him for his approval as fair
and equitable to those concerned-the shareholders and policyholders of the solvent company.
The following statement is found in the majority opinion:
"In numerous cases where the action of an administrative
officer was necessary to prevent defeat of the statutory scheme,
his participation has been upheld although the grounds for
'-Cad •
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disqualification were much more serious than those raised
here." (Emphasis added.) The author again assumes too
much. He assumes that the "statutory scheme" was being
carried out. On the contrary, the statutory scheme is being
defeated. The entire scheme for rehabilitation of insolvent
". corporations, and the statutory protection of the interested
persons therein, is abrogated through the use of the procedure
designed for mutualization of solvent corporations.
(2) I am also of the opinion that Paragraph 20(a) of the
rehabilitation agreement has never before been judicially
determined and, therefore, its provisions are not res judicata
of the present controversy. I have pointed out that there is
a separability clause in the rehabilitation agreement and that
nothing heretofore done by this, or an appellate court,. will
be affected by a holding by this court that the parties may
not validly contract to mutualize new company contrary to
the applicable statutory provisions.
(3) There should have been a trial de novo in the superior
court where evidence relative to the proper method to be
used by the price determination committee, or court-appointed
appraisers, could have been introduced by both sides and a
determination made by a judicial trier of fact. Both appellants and respondents here devote many pages of their numerous briefs to such material. Such methods are obviously
matters for experts in the field of insurance and should' be
the subject of testimony in the trial court.
( 4) If, as I firmly believe, the procedure for involuntary
mutualization of insolvent companies is the proper procedure,
sections 1049, 1050, 1051 and 1052 of the Insurance Code
contain detailed provisions for hearings and the appointment
by the court of appraisers to appraise "the then outstanding
shares of the capital stock of such insurer, without regard to
any appr~ciation or depreciation arising out of said mutualization plan as so approved or modified. Such appraisement shall
fix the reasonable value of such shares of capital stock, including the goodwill, if any, of such insurer, and shall state
the value, if any, assigned to such goodwill; and if the
appraisers shall have found that such insurer has no goodwill,
such finding shall be stated. Such appraisement, when confirmed by said court, shall be final and conclusive." (§ 1051.)
The use of the involuntary mutualization procedure for an
insolvent company follows logically from the original proceeding under sections 1010 and 1011. It should be noted
that section 1054 (still under the Insolvency and DelinquODCT

June 1955]

PACIFIC MUT. LIFE INS. Co.

v.

MCCONNELL

771

144 C.2d 715: 285 P.2d 636]

sections) provides that: "Such insurer, after mutualization,
shall be a continuation of the original insurer, and such mutualization shall not affect existing suits, rights or contracts
except as provided in said mutualization plan as approved.
Such insurer, after mutualization, shall exercise all the rights
and powers and perform all the duties conferred or imposed
by law upon insurers writing the classes of insurance written
by it, and to protect rights and contracts existing prior to
mutualization, subject to the effect of said mutualization
plan. " (Emphasis added.)
We held in Carpenter v. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. Co., 10 Ca1.2d
307, 334 [74 P.2d 761], that "reinsurance" was a contract
by which one company (new company) takes over the insurance risks of another company (old company) and becomes
substituted as an insurer in the place and stead of the original
insurer. This holding is also the logical result of following
the procedure outlined in the Insolvency and Delinquency
division of the Insurance Code.
From what Mr. Justice Traynor has said in his dissent
and for the reasons heretofore set forth by me, the conclusion is inescapable that the judgment should be reversed.
SCHAUER, J.-I concur generally in the discussion, the
reasoning and the conclusions of Mr. Justiee Carter.
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied July 27,
Carter, .T., Traynor .•T., and S('hauer, J., were of the
opinion that. the ,Petition should be "ranted.
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